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AUTHOR: 


HEIDEL, WILLIAM 
ARTHUR 


TITLE: 


ON CERTAIN 


FRAGMENTS OF THE ... 


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[BOSTON] 


DATE: 


1913 





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utier Library of Philosophy 
D109.1 | 


H36 Heidel, William Arthur, 1868-194 1 
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ees On certain fragments of the pre-Socratics: 
critical notes and elucidations... 


De (6815-734. c4com. 





Proceedings of the American 


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arts and Sciences, Vol. XLVIII, 


noe 19, May, 1913 


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Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. 


I. No. 19— May, 1913. 


ON CERTAIN FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE SOCRATICS: 


CRITICAL NOTES AND ELUCIDATIONS. 


By Wriuu1am Arruur HeEtpet, 


PROFESSOR OF GREEK IN WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY. 








ON CERTAIN FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS : 
CRITICAL NOTES AND ELUCIDATIONS. 


By ΑΜ ArtrHuR HEIDEL. 


Presented April 9. Received February 28, 1913. 


THE collection of notes here presented owes its origin to a request 
for suggestions from Professor Hermann Diels when he was engaged 
in revising Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker for the third edition, since 
published (1912). In response to his courteous invitation I sent, 
together with a list of errors noted in the second edition, a number of 
proposals for the emendation of texts and the interpretation of doubt- 
ful passages. Had I then had the requisite leisure it would have been 
my duty to explain and defend my suggestions; since that was im- 
possible, the notes then submitted were in effect mere marginalia, to 
notice which as fully as Professor Diels has done required uncommon 
courtesy. ‘To be permitted to contribute even in a small measure to 
so excellent an instrument of scholarship is an honor not lightly to 
be esteemed. The renewal of certain suggestions previously made 
but not accepted by Professor Diels is due solely to the desire to enable 
him and other scholars to judge of their merits when the case for them 
is properly presented; others, in the correctness of which I still have 
confidence, are here left unnoticed because, as referred to in the third 
edition, they are already recorded and bear on their face such creden- 
tials as are necessary for a proper estimate of their claims. But I here 
present for the first time a considerable number of proposed readings 
and interpretations, the importance of which, if approved by the 
judgment of competent scholars, must be at once apparent to the 
historian of Greek thought. If it were customary to dedicate such 
studies, I should dedicate these notes to my honored teacher and 
friend, Professor Diels, to whom I owe more for instruction and 
inspiration during a quarter of a century than I can hope to repay. 
In the following pages reference is made to chapter, page, and line 





682 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


of his second edition (V?), because the pages of this edition are noted 
also in the margin of the third (V*). 


c. 2. Anaximander. 


V? 12, 28. Plin. N. H. 2. 31. Obliquitatem eius [se. zodiaci] 
intellexisse, hoc est rerum foris aperuisse, Anaximander Milesius 
traditur primus. 


Perhaps the full significance of the clause ‘hoc. ..aperuisse,’ what- 
ever the source of the sentiment, is hardly appreciated. The Delphin 
edition refers to Plin. N. H. 35. 36 ‘artis foris apertas ab Apollodoro 
Zeuxis intravit’; but that is not a real parallel. For such we turn 
rather to Lucret. 1, 66 sq. 


Graius homo [se. Epicurus|] 

Poe ore Sarees eO Magis acrem 
irritat animi virtutem, effringere ut arta 
naturae primus portarum claustra cupiret. 
ergo vivida vis animi pervicit, et extra 
processit longe flammantia moenia mundi 
atque omne immensum peragravit mente animoque, 
unde refert nobis victor quid possit oriri 
quid nequeat, finita potestas denique cuique 
quanam sit ratione atque alte terminus haerens. 


The same conception recurs Lucret. 3, 14 sq. 


nam simul ac ratio tua coepit vociferari 
naturam rerum, divina mente coorta, 
diffugiunt animi terrores, moenia mundi 
discedunt, totum video per inane geri res. 


For these passages I would refer the reader to my essay, Die Be- 
kehrung im klassischen Altertum, mit besonderer Beriicksichtigung des 
Lucretius, Zeitschrift fiir Religionspsychologie, Bd. III, Heft 11, p. 
13 sq. Heinze’s parallels to Lucret. 3, 14 sq. ought to have made 
clear to him that there is here an allusion to the ecstatic éromreia of 
the mysteries evoked, as I pointed out, by the pronouncement of the 
ἱερὸς λόγος (ratio. ..divina mente coorta), coming as the climax of the 
rites of initiation, when the mystae catch a vision and seize the 
significance of the world (ἐποπτεύειν δὲ καὶ περινοεῖν τὴν TE φύσιν καὶ 
τὰ πράγματα), according to Clem. Alex. Strom. ὅ. 11. Miiller on Lucil. 
30, 1 compared Lucret. 1, 66 sq., and the editors of Lucretius have 


HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 683 


copied the reference, although the resemblance is altogether superficial 
and without significance. Recently Professor Reid, Lucretiana, Har- 
vard Studies in Class. Philology, Vol. 22, p. 2, has once more drawn 
attention to Sen. Dial. 8. 5. 6, Cogitatio nostra caeli munimenta per- 
rumpit nec contenta est id, quod ostenditur, scire: illud, inquit, scru- 
tor, quod ultra mundum iacet, utrumne profunda vastitas sit an et hoc 
ipsum terminis suis cludatur, ete. 1 doubt, however, the correctness 
of his statement that Seneca was here imitating Lucretius. It seems 
to me more probable that both authors are reproducing with some 
freedom the thought of an earlier, perhaps Stoic, writer, who may have 
been Posidonius. Be that as it may, the thought common to Lucre- 
tius, Seneca, and Pliny (and I may add, Bishop Dionysius, ap. Kuseb. 
P. I. 14. 27. 8) is that a great revelation has come, rending as it were 
the curtain or outer confines of the world and permitting a glimpse 
into the utmost secrets of nature. Such a revelation, according to 
Pliny, ensued upon the discovery of the obliquity of the ecliptic; and 
a study of early Greek cosmology clearly demonstrates the capital 
importance attached to it. To some aspects of this question | drew 
attention in my article, The Δίνη in Anaximenes and Anaximander, 
Class. Philol., Vol. 1, p. 279 sq. Very much more remains to be said, 
but I shall have to reserve the matter for a future occasion. 


V2 13 ο "A ξ! ὃ 9 ai ey. “ ” A. “ 4 - 
»4. AVACLUAVOPOS . . . ἀρχὴν TE και TTOLXELOV ELPHKE τῶν ὄντων 
TO ἄπειρον. 


‘or the meaning of ἀρχή Diels refers in V* to the preliminary 
statement in my Ilepi Φύσεως, Proceed. of Amer. Acad. of Arts and Sc., 
Vol. 45, p. 79, n. 8. The subject has now received a fuller treatment 
in my essay On Anaximander, Class. Philol., Vol. 8 (1912), p. 212 sq. 
To the statement there given, though much might be said by way of 
enlargement and confirmation, I think it unnecessary to add anything, 
except to say that the results of my investigations dovetail admirably 
into certain other observations recently made by different scholars. 
I refer among others to the views of Otto Gilbert as to the original 
meaning of the ‘elements’ set forth in his Griech. Religionsphilosophie, 
1911, which reached me at the same time with the off-prints of my 
essay; and to Mr. Cornford’s conception of Μοῖρα as developed in 
From Religion to Philosophy, 1912. Unfortunately both these authors 
accept the Peripatetic tradition regarding the meaning of Anaxi- 
mander’s ἀρχή; consequently their observations - remain fruitless 
when they proceed to interpret the early history of Greek philosophy. 





6HS4 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


V? 13, 7. διδόναι yap αὐτὰ δίκην καὶ τίσιν ἀλλήλοις τῆς ἀδικίας κατὰ 


τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν. 


In his note on this passage (V* 15, 28) Diels repeats his former 
explanation, “ἀλλήλοις: dativus commodi: das Untergehende dem 
Uberlebenden und dieses wieder untergehend dem kiinftig Entsteh- 
enden. Vgl. Eur. Chrysipp. fr. 839, 15. This interpretation, which 
is that now currently accepted, rests obviously on the assumption 
that the preceding sentence in Simplicius, ἐξ ὧν δὲ ἡ γένεσίς ἐστι 
τοῖς οὖσι, Kal τὴν φθορὰν eis ταῦτα γίνεσθαι κατὰ TO χρεών, preserves 
the authentic words of Anaximander and that, in consequence, it 15 
individual things or objects (τὰ ὄντα) that mutually exact and pay the 
penalty for injustice done to one another. On that view Diels’s elab- 
oration of the implications of ἀλλήλοις is both obvious and necessary. 
I believe, however, that in my essay On Anaximander, p. 233 sq., | 
showed conclusively (1) that it is not individual objects but the 
contraries, hot and cold, that encroach on one another and _ suffer 
periodic punishment inflicted by each on the other (wherefore ἀλλήλοις 
is here to be interpreted as a strict reciprocal and not as Diels pro- 
poses), and (2) that when this mutual κόλασις is said to recur κατὰ 
τὴν τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν, reference is had to the seasonal excess of the hot 
in summer and of the cold in winter. The strict limitations of space 
imposed upon my essay led to the exclusion of many things which | 
reluctantly omitted, and did not admit of a full statement of my views. 
I propose, therefore, here to add a few points which may serve to 
explain and confirm them. Zeller insists that for Anaximander one 
pair of contraries only, the hot and the cold, existed, at least as prima- 
rily proceeding from the ἄπειρον; this would rule out the moist and 
the dry, which are mentioned with the first pair by Simplicius, as due 
to Aristotle. This may be true, but it is not necessarily so; for the 
Empedoclean and Hippocratic group of four contraries is too well 
attested, and if, as seems certain, Anaximander had in mind the sea- 
sonal changes it is hard to conceive of him as overlooking the differ- 
ences In drought and moisture which Simplicius mentions with those 
of heat and cold. A passage strikingly illustrating and interpreting 
that of Simplicius is found in Philo, De Anim. Sacrif. Idon. IT. 242 
Mang. ἡ δὲ εἰς μέλη τοῦ ζῴου διανομὴ δηλοῖ, ἤτοι ws ἕν τὰ πάντα ἢ ὅτι ἐξ 
ἑνός τε καὶ εἰς ἕν - ὅπερ οἱ μὲν κόρον καὶ χρησμοσύνην ἐκάλεσαν, οἱ δ᾽ 
ἐκπύρωσιν καὶ διακόσμησιν " ἐκπύρωσιν μὲν κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ δυναστείαν 
τῶν ἄλλων ἐπικρατήσαντος, διακόσμησιν δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῶν τεττά- 
ρων στοιχείων ἰσονομίαν, ἣν ἀντιδιδόασιν ἀλλήλοις. Philo 


HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. O85 


is of course far from thinking of Anaximander and has in mind 
Heraclitus and the Stoics only; but we know that the conception of 
Heraclitus was older than the fifth century, being traceable to Ale- 
maeon, a contemporary of Anaximander. The isovouia τῶν δυνάμεων 
(Alemaeon, fr. 4), as the condition of health, and the ἐπικράτεια and 
πλεονεξία of the several constituents of the human body as the cause 
of disease, are fixed factors of practically the whole medical tradition 
of Greece. We may therefore confidently affirm that the icovouta 
«τῶν στοιχείων or rather τῶν ἐναντιοτήτων;» ἣν ἀντιδιδόασιν ἀλλήλοις, 
which Philo attributes to Heraclitus and the Stoics, applies with equal 
propriety to Anaximander, and explains his meaning. These different 
factors, correlated also with the seasonal changes, are mentioned by 
Plato, Legg. 906 C, φαμὲν δ᾽ εἶναί που τὸ νῦν ὀνομαζόμενον ἁμάρτημα, 
τὴν πλεονεξίαν, ἐν μὲν σαρκίνοις σώμασιν νόσημα καλούμενον, ἐν δὲ ὥραις 
ἐτῶν καὶ ἐνιαυτοῖς λοιμόν, ἐν δὲ πόλεσιν καὶ πολιτείαις τοῦτο αὐτό, ῥήματι 
μετεσχηματισμένον, ἀδικίαν. The connection, here hardly more than 
suggested, is clearly noted by Plato, Symp. 188 A, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡ τῶν 
ὡρῶν τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ σύστασις μεστή ἐστιν ἀμφοτέρων τούτων, Kal ἐπειδὰν 
μὲν πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῦ κοσμίου τύχῃ ἔρωτος ἃ νυνδὴ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον, τά τε θερμὰ 
καὶ τὰ ψυχρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ ὑγρά, καὶ ἁρμονίαν καὶ κρᾶσιν λάβῃ σώφρονα, 
ἥκει φέροντα εὐετηρίαν τε καὶ ὑγίειαν ἀνθρώποις καὶ, τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις τε 
καὶ φυτοῖς, καὶ οὐδὲν ἠδίκησεν " ὅταν δὲ ὁ μετὰ τῆς ὕβρεως "ἔρως ἔγκρατε- 
OTEPOS περὶ τὰς τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ ὥρας γένηται, διέφθειρέν τε πολλὰ καὶ 
ἠδίκησεν. On this passage cp. Hirzel, Themis, Dike und Verwandtes, 
p. 220 sq. The medical doctrine expounded by Eryximachus in the 
Symposium, although perhaps slightly colored with Heraclitean 
thought, is that of the Hippocratic treatises, notably of Περὶ φύσιος 
ἀνθρώπου, trom which we may quote one passage, ¢ 7 (6.48 L.), κατὰ 
φύσιν yap αὐτέῳ ταῦτά ἐστι μάλιστα τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ... ἔχει μὲν οὖν ταῦτα 


πάντα αἰεὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, ὑπὸ δὲ τῆς περιισταμένης ὥρης ποτὲ 


μὲν πλείω γίνεται αὐτὰ ἑωυτῶν, ποτὲ δὲ ἐλάσσω, ἕκαστα κατὰ μέρος [ΞΞ ἐν 
μέρει] καὶ κατὰ φύσιν [sc. τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ] .. . ἰσχύει δὲ ἐν τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ τοτὲ 
μὲν ὁ χειμὼν μάλιστα, τοτὲ δὲ τὸ ἦρ, τοτὲ δὲ τὸ θέρος, τοτὲ δὲ τὸ φθινό- 
πωρον " οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τοτὲ μὲν τὸ φλέγμα ἰσχύει, τοτὲ δὲ τὸ 
αἷμα, τοτὲ δὲ ἡ χολή, πρῶτον μὲν ἡ ξανθή, ἔπειτα δ᾽ ἡ μέλαινα καλεομένη. 
Not to repeat what I have elsewhere said in regard to the doctrines 
of Heraclitus and Empedocles, I refer the reader to my essay Qualitative 
Change in Pre-Socratic Philosophy, Archiv fiir Gesch. der Philos., 
Vol. 19. pp. 360 sq. and 365. Since the ἀδικία and the δίκη καὶ τίσις 
of Anaximander refer not to the origin and destruction of individual 
objects but to the successive encroachment of the elemental opposites 





6S6 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


one on another in the seasonal changes of the year, it follows that the 
words of Anaximander cannot be used to support the interpretation 
of his ἄπειρον-ἀρχή as a metaphysical world-ground in which the sin 
of individual existence is punished by the reabsorption of the concrete 
objects of experience. For this see On Anaximander, p. 225, n. 3, and 
my review of James Adam, The Vitality of Platonism and Other Essays, 


Amer. Journ. of Philol., Vol. 33 (1912), p. 93 sq. 


V? 13, 34. [Plut.] Strom. 2, φησὶ δὲ τὸ ἐκ τοῦ ἀιδίου γόνιμον θερμοῦ 
τε καὶ ψυχροῦ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου ἀποκριθῆναι καί τινα 
ἐκ τούτου φλογὸς σφαῖραν περιφυῆναι τῷ περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀέρι ὡς τῷ 
δένδρῳ φλοιόν. ἧστινος ἀπορραγείσης καὶ εἴς τινας ἀποκλεισθείσης 
κύκλους ὑποστῆναι τὸν ἥλιον καὶ τὴν σελήνην καὶ τοὺς ἀστέρας. 


The words τὸ... ψυχροῦ have been much discussed ἀπ variously 
interpreted. Zeller, I* 220, n. 1, pronounces the text corrupt and 
suggests φησὶ δ᾽ ἐκ τοῦ ἀιδίου τὸ γόνιμον θερμόν τε καὶ ψυχρόν, rejecting 
Neuhiiuser’s obviously correct proposal to take the genitives θερμοῦ 
and ψυχροῦ as depending on γόνιμον. Burnet, Karly Greek Philo- 
sophy’, p. 66, retaining the traditional text, renders, “Something 
‘apable of begetting hot and cold was separated off from the eternal.”’ 
If we were dealing with a poet we might take such liberties, but we 
may safely dismiss the interpretation as impossible for prose. Diels 
gives no definite indication of his understanding of the words, but 
claims γόνιμον as possibly belonging to Anaximander, certainly to 
Theophrastus, referring in support of his contention to Porphyr. De 
Abstin. 2.5. The text of Porphyry, however, throws no light on ours, 
and there is good reason to doubt whether we may attribute the word 
to Theophrastus. In all probability we are dealing with a Stoic 
source, however related to Theophrastus; for γόνιμον seems to be 
a congener to the λόγος σπερματικός of the Stoics. Cp. Mare. Aurel. 
9. 1.4, λέγω δὲ τὸ χρῆσθαι τούτοις ἐπίσης THY κοινὴν φύσιν ἀντὶ τοῦ συμ- 
βαίνειν ἐπίσης κατὰ τὸ ἑξῆς τοῖς γινομένοις καὶ ἐπιγινομένοις ὁρμῇ τινι 
ἀρχαίᾳ τῆς προνοίας, καθ᾽ ἣν ἀπό τινος ἀρχῆς ὥρμησεν ἐπὶ τήνδε τὴν 
διακόσμησιν, συλλαβοῦσά τινας λόγους τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ δυνάμεις γονίμους 
ἀφορίσασα ὑποστἀσεὠν τε καὶ μεταβολῶν καὶ διαδοχῶν τοιούτων. It 
seems fairly certain that τὸ... γόνιμον θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ is the 
Stoic ἄποιος ὕλη which contains δυνάμει the hot and the cold of the 
cosmos. We thus find masked in Stoic phraseology the φύσις ἀόριστος 
of Theophrastus. This γόνιμον θερμοῦ τε καὶ ψυχροῦ is, at least in 
extent, not identical with the ἄπειρον itself, but was “separated off” 
from it at the origin of our cosmos. It must, therefore, be that por- 





HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. UST 


tion of the ἄπειρον-ἀρχή which gave rise to the present world. Tan- 
nery, Zeller, Burnet, and others regard ἐκ τοῦ ἀιδίου as referring to the 
ἄπειρον, thinking perhaps of certain passages referring to Xenophanes, 
Melissus, and Anaxagoras; but Zeller at least perceived that this was 
not to be accepted without considerable violence to the text. I main- 
tain the correctness of my suggestion, On Anaximander, p. 229, n. 2, 
that we are to supply ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀπείρου with ἀποκριθῆναι, whether it 
ever stood in the text or not, and that the phrase ἐκ τοῦ ἀιδίου, which 
stands just where it belongs, means “from eternity.” We are familiar 
with és ἀίδιον, “forever,” and Marc. Aurel. 2. 14; 4. 21; 10. 5 thrice 
uses ἐξ ἀιδίου in that sense, and numerous other instances might be 
cited. It happens that I cannot point to another instance of ἐκ τοῦ 
ἀιδίου, but the analogy of parallel expressions occurring with and 
without the article would render it not at all surprising if such should 
be found in late authors. The expression under consideration may be 
taken with confidence to mean “ The eternal substratum capable by 
dynamic evolution of producing hot and cold.”’ 

The remainder of this interesting passage also deserves renewed 
consideration. It speaks of a ‘sphere of flame,’ and this appears to be 
generally accepted as establishing the sphericity of Anaximander’s 
cosmos. Diels has not, to my knowledge, expressed himself in un- 
mistakable terms; but his description of the φλογὸς σφαῖρα as a “ Wa- 
berlohe” would be best taken as applicable to a circle. A conclusion 
so opposed to the apparent meaning of the word σφαῖρα will surprise 
no one who is familiar with the general ambiguity of words in Greek 
meaning ‘round’ and the uncritical habit among later authors of 
attributing Eudoxian notions to earlier cosmologists and astronomers, 
provided that the remainder of the statement points to a circle rather 
than a sphere. I have no intention of discussing here the whole 
subject, which would require a connected examination of all the data 
of early Greek cosmology, but propose to confine my attention to this 
one passage. It is pertinent, however, to remark that on other 
grounds I have elsewhere found reasons for doubting the correctness 
of the Aristotelian account, which places the earth in Anaximander’s 
scheme at the center of a sphere; for if Aristotle’s authority is accepted 
as final, the interpretation here offered will be ruled out of court 
without a hearing. See my essay, The Δίνη in Anaximenes and 
Anaximander, Class. Philol., Vol. 1, p. 279 sq., especially p. 281. 

Let us then address ourselves to the text: καί τινα ἐκ τούτου φλογὸς 
σφαῖραν περιφυῆναι τῷ περὶ τὴν γῆν ἀέρι ὡς τῷ δένδρῳ φλοιόν * ἧστινος 
ἀπορραγείσης καὶ εἴς τινας ἀποκλεισθείσης κύκλους ὑποστῆναι τὸν ἥλιον καὶ 











OSS PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


τὴν σελήνην Kal τοὺς ἀστέρας. The orthodox view appears to be that 
a sphere of flame is somehow exploded and (rather curiously!) reduced 
to a succession of circles of flame confined within an envelope of mist; 
these circles being those which constitute sun, moon, and stars. 
We have come to expect definite analogies and clear ‘ Anschauung’ 
among the early Greek philosophers; and the severe strain which the 
current view puts on the imagination would of itself cast suspicion 
on it. We might nevertheless feel compelled, however reluctantly, 
to accept it, if the details of the account itself pointed to it or were 
even consistent with it. It will probably be conceded that — the 
term σφαῖρα apart — it is vastly simpler to conceive of a wide annu- 
lar mass breaking up into annular parts than to imagine the same 
result ensuing from the destruction of a sphere. But as a matter of 
fact our text says nothing that may fairly be interpreted as implying 
the breaking or exploding of the sphere. The crucial words are 
περιφυῆναι and aroppayeions. Perhaps the real force of neither word 
has been appreciated. Here περιφυῆναι means that the “sphere” at 
first “snugly fitted” or was “closely attached to” the “air” which 
encircles the earth; whereas aroppayeions states merely that subse- 
quently it became detached, as even a superficial attention to the nor- 
mal meaning of the terms will convince the reader. The contrast 
may be illustrated by Arist. Hist. Animal. 5. 19. 552°3, ταῦτα δὲ χρόνον 
MEV τινα κινεῖται προσπεφυκότα, ἔπειτ᾽ ἀπορραγέντα φέρεται κατὰ TO ὕδωρ, 
αἱ καλούμεναι ἀσκαρίδες. Besides, ἀπορρηγνύναι is not the proper word 
to use of the tearing of such an envelope as a sphere of flame; Greek 
writers so use ῥηγνύναι, διαρρηγνύναι, and περιρρηγνύναι, especially 
the last-mentioned, as might be shown by a long list of examples 
derived from Aristotle and other authors. The same general concep- 
tion is implied in the simile ὡς τῷ δένδρῳ φλοιόν. We may not press 
similes beyond the immediate point of comparison, which ἴῃ this 
instance is the snugness of the fit; but if one is to press it, it is 
obvious that the bark of a tree is annular rather than spherical. It 
will hardly serve the interest of the objector to refer to Anaximander’s 
notion of the prickly integument of the first animals, V2 17, 18, ἐν 
ὑγρῷ γενηθῆναι τὰ πρῶτα ζῷα φλοιοῖς περιεχόμενα akavOwdeor... 
περιρρηγνυμένου τοῦ φλοιοῦ ; for there, as περιρρηγνυμένου sufficiently 
shows, the conception is altogether different. It is quite possible, as 
later Greek thinkers prove, to conceive of the cosmos and the human 
embryo as equally inclosed in a ὑμήν without pressing the comparison 
beyond reason. I have noted with some interest another passage in 
which the meaning of ἀπορρηγνύναι has been similarly misconceived. 


HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. OS9 


Arist. Hist. Animal. 5.18. 549° 31 sq. the spawning of the octopus 
and the development of its young are described. There we read 
000" 3, τὰ μὲν οὖν τῶν πολυπόδων μεθ᾽ ἡμέρας μάλιστα πεντήκοντα γίνεται 
ἐκ τῶν ἀπορραγέντων πολυπόδια, καὶ ἐξέρτπει, ὥσπερ τὰ φαλάγγια, πολλὰ 
τὸ πλῆθος. Professor Thompson in his recent translation renders it 
thus: “Some fifty days later, the eggs burst and the little polupuses 
creep out”’ litalies mine]. In fact there is no reference to the bursting 
of the eggs. Aristotle’s meaning is that that which develops into the 
individual polyp becomes detached from the vine-like mass which he 
has previously described, and that the young crawl forth (not from 
the eggs, but) from the hole or vessel in which the spawn was deposited. 

To return to the cosmology of Anaximander: the words καὶ εἴς τινας 
ἀποκλεισθείσης κύκλους refer not specifically to σφαῖρα but to φλόξ. 
The Waberlohe by some means, doubtless identical with that which 
detached the envelope of flame from the envelope of “air” was segre- 
gated into a number of annular masses, each like the earth inclosed 
in an envelope of “air.” This segregation is not specifically mentioned 
but must be inferred; and we can guess only at the immediate cause 
of it. Now it is fairly certain that Anaximander knew the obliquity 
of the ecliptic or, as the early Greeks seem regularly to have called it, 
the inclination or dip of the zodiac or ecliptic. Pliny, as we have 
seen, attached great significance to its discovery, and so far as we 
know all the early Greek philosophers regarded it as an actual dipping 
resulting from some cause subsequently to the origin of the cosmos. 
Such an event would amply explain the initial break between the 
respective envelopes of “air” and flame; what caused the subsequent 
disintegration of the circle of flame into separate rings we do not 
know and perhaps it were idle further to speculate. 


V? 17, 18. Aet. 5. 19. 4, ᾿Αναξίμανδρος ἐν ὑγρῷ γενηθῆναι τὰ πρῶτα 
ζῷα φλοιοῖς περιεχόμενα ἀκανθώδεσι, προβαινούσης δὲ τῆς ἡλικίας 
ἀποβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὸ ξηρότερον καὶ περιρρηγνυμένου τοῦ φλοιοῦ ἐπ᾽ 
ὀλίγον μεταβιῶναι. 


In V' 8"4 2 the word χρόνον was omitted by mistake after ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον; 
his attention having been called to the omission by me, Diels has re- 
stored it in V*. Ordinarily a fact of this sort would hardly deserve to 
be noted; but since the false reading has found its way into Kranz’s 
Wortindex, s. v. μεταβιοῦν, and has been quoted without question by 
various writers, as e. g. by Otto Gilbert, Die meteorol. Theorien des gr. 
Altertums, p. 332, n. 1, and Kinkel, Gesch. der Philos., I. p. 7*, it calls 
for more than a tacit correction. This is the more necessary because 














690 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


the text has been very generally misunderstood and false conclusions 
have been drawn from it. It is perhaps unnecessary to recount in 
detail this chapter of curious errors. I have no means of knowing 
what interpretation Diels now puts on the text; but in the absence 
of any indication in his notes it seems reasonable to assume that he 
still adheres to the view briefly set forth in the index to his Dowo- 
graphi Graeci, s. v. μεταβιοῦν: “mutare vitam [cf. μεταδιαιτᾶν]. This 
may be said to have been the common view of recent interpreters, until 
Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy*, p. 72 sq., correcting the version 
of his first edition, returned to the correct rendering of Brucker, 
“ruptoque cortice non multum temporis supervixisse,” which Teich- 
miller with characteristic ignorance of Greek sharply condemned, 
Studien zur Gesch. der Begriffe, p. 64, n. Tannery, Pour histoire de 
la science helléne, pp. 87 and 117, gives in effect two renderings, each 
incorrect. The important point to note is that ἡλικία can refer to 
nothing but the age of the individual; and that ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον χρόνον can 
have but one meaning, to wit, “for a short time only.” The force 
of μεταβιῶναι must, therefore, be determined with reference to these 
known quantities of the problem. This once granted, the decision 
between the rival claims of vritam mutasse and supervixisse is easy and 
certain. To be sure, μετά in composition far more frequently implies 
change than it denotes ‘after’; but μεταδειπνεῖν is as well attested as 
μεταδιαιτᾶν. However if, as seemed plausible from Diels’s earlier 
editions, it were possible to conceive that the correct text was ἐπ᾽ 
ὀλίγον μεταβιῶναι, one might have inclined to take ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον in the 
sense of “to a small extent,” as in Arist. Meteor. 350” 28 and Mar- 
cellinus, Vita Thucyd. 36, and to interpret μεταβιῶναι as referring to 
a change in the mode of life. Another possibility, which I have con- 
sidered, would be to take ἐπ᾽ ὀλίγον and μεταβιῶναι in the sense just 
indicated and to read χρόνῳ for χρόνον, thus obtaining the sense “ they 
changed their mode of life to a small extent in course of time.”’ This 
suggestion was very tempting to one who was prepared to find an 
anticipation of Darwinism in Anaximander; but against all these 
proposals ἡλικία stands with its inexorable veto. The sort of change 
contemplated would require more than one life-time, and ἡλικία limits 
the action of μεταβθιῶναι to the life-period of the individual. We must 
therefore content ourselves with the rendering “As they advanced 
toward maturity the first animals proceeded from the wet on to the 
drier ground and as their integument burst (and was sloughed off) 
they survived but a little while.”” Perhaps this interpretation may 
be further supported by a comparison of the view thus obtained with 





HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 691 


that of the origin of animal life attributed to Archelaus, V2 324, 18, 
περὶ δὲ ζῴων φησίν, ὅτι θερμαινομένης THs γῆς TO πρῶτον ἐν τῷ κάτω μέρει, 
ὅπου τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἐμίσγετο, ἀνεφαίνετο τά τε ἄλλα ζῷα πολλὰ 
καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, ἅπαντα τὴν αὐτὴν δίαιταν ἔχοντα ἐκ τῆς ἰλύος τρεφόμενα 
(ἦν δὲ ὀλιγοχρόνια)᾽ ὕστερον δὲ αὐτοῖς ἡ ἐξ ἀλλήλων γένεσις συνέστη. 


c.3. Anaximenes. 
V? 17, 37. οὗτος ἀρχὴν ἀέρα εἶπεν καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον. 


In his note in V® Diels says: “ Missverstiindnis oder Verderbnis 
statt καὶ τοῦτον ἄπειρον. This suggestion is plausible, but far from 
certain. As I showed in my study of ἀρχή, On Anaximander, various 
vestiges of an earlier cosmological, non-metaphysical, sense of that 
word survive in Aristotle; it can hardly be thought impossible that 
the same should be true of Theophrastus, from whom this statement 
of Diogenes ultimately derives. Indeed, as we shall see when we 
discuss Diogenes’s account of the cosmology of Leucippus (ep. p. 732, 
on δ᾽" 343, 1), there is at least one such vestige, though almost obliter- 
ated by the unintelligence of excerptors or copyists. But, leaving 
that for the present aside, we are credibly informed that Anaximenes 
regarded the outer “air”? as boundless, upon which fact Diels relies 
for his proposed correction; and we know that Anaximenes held the 
doctrine of the cosmic respiration, in accordance with which the 
cosmos subsists, as it arises, by receiving its substance from the 
encircling ἄπειρον in the form of πνεῦμα or breath. This πνεῦμα comes 
from and returns to the ἄπειρον, which is therefore nothing else but an 
ἀρχὴ καὶ πηγή, or reservoir, of πνεῦμα. We thus have a complete 
parallel, so far as concerns the πνεῦμα-ἀήρ, to the doctrine of the 
early Pythagoreans reported by Aristotle. Cp. my Antecedents of 
Greck Corpuscular Theories, p. 139 sq. In δ᾽ 1. 354, 16 sq. Diels has 
corrected the text of Aristotle along the lines I suggested. I cannot, 
however, approve of the bracketing of χρόνου, ib. 22, as proposed by 
Diels. 


V? 18, 30 sq. Hippolytus, Ref. 1.7. 


The corrupt state of the text of Hippolytus’s Philosophumena, 
especially in the first book, is well known. With the aid of Cedrenus 
Diels has been able to set many passages right; yet much remains 
to be done. In 1. 7, the chapter devoted to Anaximenes, several 
additions or interpolations which ought to be removed or bracketed 





692 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


still encumber the text, though we cannot determine to whom they 
are due. Diels formerly bracketed πυκνότατον (V2 18, 39), but now 
contents himself with characterizing it as an inaccuracy of the late 
compiler. There are, however, two larger additions which are false 
and misleading. V? 18, 31, ἀέρα ἄπειρον ἔφη τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι, ἐξ οὗ 
τὰ γινόμενα καὶ τὰ γεγονότα καὶ τὰ ἐσόμενα καὶ θεοὺς καὶ 
θεῖα γίνεσθαι, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ ἐκ τῶν τούτου Iso Diels, following C: 
τούτων ΤΠ] ἀπογόνων. It is obvious that in the statement of Theoph- 
rastus the ἀπόγονοι were those of the first generation, and not the 
absurd list we here have presented to us. The primary forms of 
existence are afterwards mentioned, V? 18, 35-40: the report of 
Theophrastus is even better preserved by Cie. Acad. 2. 37. 118 (V° 19, 
16), “Anaximenes infinitum aéra, sed ea, quae ex eo orerentur, defi- 
nita: gigni autem terram, aquam, agnem, tum ex ils omnia. The 
variant readings above noted are probably due to the Intrusion of the 
impertinent clause, which clearly does not derive from Theophrastus. 
Whether Hippolytus or some other made the addition | find it diffi- 
cult to decide. “A second instance of the same kind occurs V* 18, 35, 
κινεῖσθαι δὲ ἀεί" οὐ γὰρ μεταβάλλειν ὅσα μεταβάλλει, εἰ μὴ κινοῖτο. 
This sentence is awkward and intervenes between two parts of the 
exposition of the changes to which “air” is subject. What we expect 
from Theophrastus is something about the κίνησις ἀίδιος, and doubt- 
less he did refer to it here. The clause κινεῖσθαι δὲ ἀεί in all probabil- 
‘tv is sound and derives from him; but the sentence od γὰρ | 
κινοῖτο introduces a foreign element. Perhaps Hippolytus found it 
in his immediate source. 

I add here a note on V2 19, 2, where the MSS read ἀνέμους δὲ γεννᾶ- 
σθαι. ὅταν ἐκπεπυκνωμένος ὁ ἀὴρ ἀραιωθεὶς φέρηται, and Diels prints 
ὅταν ἢ πεπυκνωμένος ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ ὠσθεὶς φέρηται. ‘This reading seems to 
me to depart farther than necessary from the MS. text. I would 


propose ὅταν ἢ π. ὃ ἀὴρ ἢ ἀραιωθεὶς φέρηται. Though a greater degree 
of rarefaction or condensation would, according to Anaximenes, re- 
sult in fire or cloud respectively, it does not appear why he might 
not have held that a more moderate change in either direction gave 


rise to wind. 
c.11. Xenophanes. 


V2? 34,16. Diog. L. 9.19, (φησὶ) τὰ νέφη συνίστασθαι τῆς ἀφ᾽ ἡλίου 
ἀτμίδος ἀναφερομένης καὶ αἰρούσης αὖ τα εἰς τὸ περιέχον. 


Diels still regards this doxography preserved by Diogenes as de- 
rived from Theophrastus through the biographical line of tradition. 








HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 6093 


The whole account is, as Diels, Doxographi Graeci, p. 168, pointed out, 
remarkable for its curious statements. I confess that, if it be really 
derived from Theophrastus, it seems to me to have suffered changes 
similar in character to those of the doxography of Hippolytus (V? 41, 
25 sq.), which owes much of its data to the Pseudo-Aristotelian 
treatise De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia. But first let us speak of 
the passage transcribed above. What Xenophanes taught concerning 
the origin of clouds is clearly stated by Aet. 3. 4. 4 (V2 43, 20), 
ἀνελκομένου γὰρ ἐκ τῆς θαλάττης τοῦ ὑγροῦ τὸ γλυκὺ διὰ THY λεπτομέρειαν 
διακρινόμενον νέφη τε συνιστάνειν ὁμιχλούμενον καὶ καταστάζειν ὄμβρους 
ὑπὸ πιλήσεως καὶ διατμίζειν τὰ πνεύματα. Cp. also fr. 30. It is clear 
that Theophrastus simply stated the theory of the meteoric process, ac- 
cording to which clouds originate from vapors rising under the action 
of solar heat and lifting skyward. In the text of Diogenes we readily 
note two inaccuracies. We should doubtless read ὑφ᾽ for ad’, since 
vapors rising from the sun are sheer nonsense. The other difficulty 
is at first more puzzling; for a vapor lifting clouds skyward is non- 
sense likewise. The vapor condensed to mist or fog (ὁμιχλούμενον) is 
cloud. I therefore suggested to Professor Diels that we bracket αὐτά 
and take aipovens in its intransitive sense: he records, but does not 
accept, the proposal in his third edition. It is at once clear that this 
would remove all! difficulties from the passage. Probably Professor 
Diels was doubtful about the intransitive use of alpw, which the lexica 
almost entirely ignore. Of that usage I gave examples in a Note on 
Menander, Epitrepontes 103 sq., published in Berl. Philol. Wochenschr., 
1909, No. 16, col. 509 sq. I there cited Plato, Phaedr. 248 A, Arist. 
Respir. 475° 8 and 479° 26, Sophocl. Philoct. 1330. To these in- 
stances I would now add Sophocl. O. R. 914 and the Schol. to 
Sophocl. ad loc. and p. 239, 4; Proclus in Tim. 1. 78, 2 Diehl. 
Other examples, concerning which there may be some doubt, I now 
omit, but may recur to the subject another time. There can be no 
question, therefore, that αἴρειν was used intransitively, and in our 
passage the change appears to be demanded by the sense. Probably 
some one not familiar with the usage added αὐτά in order to supply 
an object, but in so doing he gave us nonsense. 

In this same paragraph occur the words (V? 34, 18) ὅλον δὲ ὁρᾶν καὶ 
ὅλον ἀκούειν, μὴ μέντοι ἀναπνεῖν. I discussed this passage briefly 
in Antecedents of Greek Corpuscular Theories, p. 137 sq., pointing out 
its agreement with Plato, Tim. 32 C-33 C. I ought in justice to say 
that the parallel had been previously noted by Tannery, Pour l’ histoire 
de la science helléne, p. 121, though the fact had slipped from my memory. 





694 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


Since my previous discussion I have come to doubt whether the words 
of the Timaeus may be used to support the statement of Diogenes. 
About the agreement itself there can be no question. Plato does not, 
however, mention Xenophanes, and there is no indication in his text 
that what he says is to be taken as a correct statement of his doctrine. 
Tf we were quite sure that the report of Diogenes came materially 
unchanged from Theophrastus, the parallel would unquestionably 
prove that Xenophanes expressly denied the doctrine of the cosmic 
respiration. ‘Tannery would then be justified in holding, as he aid, 
that the brief notice of Diogenes was a precious document showing 
beyond question that Nenophanes was engaged in a sharp polemic 
against the Pythagoreans, whose doctrine, amply attested by sn 
he emphatically denied. ‘Tannery's position would be untenable 
except on the assumption that Pythagoras himself proposed ἐδε 
theory of cosmic respiration: the testimony of Aristotle, however, 
who refers (as always) not to Pythagoras but to the Pythagoreans, 
is scarcely adequate to establish it. On the other hand, as has already 
been said, the accuracy and integrity of the account of Diogenes is 
subject to grave suspicion. The statement with which it opens, that 
Xenophanes held the doctrines of the four physical elements (στοιχεῖα) 
and of innumerable worlds, cannot be reconciled with other data 
unquestionably derived from Theophrastus. | Again, the sentence 
V2 34, 19, πρῶτός τε ἀπεφήνατο ὅτι πᾶν TO γινόμενον φθαρτόν ἐστι, in 
which Otto Gilbert, Die meteorol. Theorten des gr. Altertums, p. 98, 
n. 1, sees “nur ein ungenauer Ausdruck fiir die Riickbildung der 
Elemente in den Urstoff”’ (!), appears to be nothing but an echo of 
the anecdote related by Arist. Rhet. 2.23 1399» 6 (Vv 30, 21), οἷον 
Ξενοφάνης ἔλεγεν ὅτι “ὁμοίως ἀσεβοῦσιν οἱ γενέσθαι φάσκοντες τοὺς θεοὺς 
τοῖς ἀποθανεῖν λέγουσιν, and of De Melisso, Xenophane, ssa, 9% ss 
14 sq., which latter passage in turn incorporates arguments derived 
from Plato. This fact should give us pause, and suggests that 
Diogenes’s account of the philosophy of Xenophanes 1s derived from 
a source which, like that of Hippolytus (V? 41, 25 sq.) and Simplicius 
(V2 40, 21 sq.), sought to eke out the scanty Theophrastean summary 
with information coming from the spurious De Melisso, enopnane, 
Gorgia, and ultimately from the Timaeus and Parmenides of Plato. 
I am therefore inclined to believe that the statement of Diogenes, 
μὴ μέντοι ἀναπνεῖν, rests solely on the Timaeus, which the compiler 
regarded as a trustworthy source for the philosophy of Xenophanes. 

I may add a brief note on the word πρῶτος in the sentence just 
quoted (V? 34, 19). Diels long ago observed that the claim of 





HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 695 


Xenophanes to be the originator of this doctrine is absurd and opposed 
to statements of Aristotle and Theophrastus. How came the claim 
to be made? During the sixth and fifth centuries B. C., as we well 
know, much interest attached to the inventors of contrivances and 
the first propounders of ideas, as was entirely natural in the fine burst 
of individualism characteristic of the epoch. We commonly think of 
the passionate quest for εὑρήματα during the Alexandrian Age, but 
Herodotus (1.25; 1.171; 2.4; 2.24; 2.109; 3.131; 4.42: 4.44) and 
the earlier logographers display the same interest. The exaggerations 
to which claims of this nature led have been well illustrated by Pro- 
fessor J. S. Reid, Lucretiana, Harvard Studies in Class. Philol., 
Vol. 22 (1911), p. 1 sq. in his note on Lucret. 1, 66 sq. Certain 
peculiarities of phrase used in such connections deserve attention. 
Thus Herod. 1.25 says, Γλαύκου τοῦ Χίου, ds μοῦνος δὴ πάντων ἀνθρώ- 
πων σιδήρου κόλλησιν ἐξεῦρε, USINg μοῦνος, Where we might have ex- 
pected πρῶτος, to denote the sole original authorship of Glaucus. 
When data were collected for the later compilations such turns may 
have given rise to errors. In some such way we may perhaps account 
for the embarrassment of Simplicius (ΟΣ 18, 19) in regard to Anaxi- 
menes: ἐπὶ yap τούτου μόνου Oeddpacros ... τὴν μάνωσιν εἴρηκε Kal 
πύκνωσιν, δῆλον δὲ ὡς καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι τῇ μανότητι καὶ πυκνότητι ἐχρῶντο. 
Here Diels formerly accepted Usener’s suggestion of πρώτου for μόνου, 
but has latterly with good reason returned to the MS. reading, which 
the context requires. 


V? 36. De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia 977? 18, ταὐτὰ γὰρ ἅπαντα 
| yap 
τοῖς γε ἴσοις Kal ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν πρὸς ἄλληλα. 


Here Diels follows the reading of L, except that he rightly changes 
ταῦτα to ταὐτά: RK, which is second only to L, gives ἴσοις ἢ ὁμοίοις. 
Probably neither reading is correct. Arist. De Gen. et Corr. 1. 7. 
323° 5 has πάντα yap ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ταὐτὰ τοῖς ὁμοίοις. Both pas- 
sages, however, rest upon Plato, Parm. 139 E-140 D, where the 
implications of the ὅμοιον and ἀνόμοιον are first considered, then those 
of the ἴσον and ἄνισον. In view of this fact I think we should read 
τοῖς YE ἴσοις Kal <Gpolois> ὁμοίως. 


c.12. Heraclitus. 


V? 61, 35. Fr. 1, ὁκοίων ἐγὼ διηγεῦμαι διαιρέων ἕκαστον κατὰ φύσιν 
καὶ φράζων ὅκως ἔχει. 


These words have been variously interpreted. So far as I am aware 





696 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


evervbody has regarded φύσις as meaning “nature” in some one of 
its numerous acceptations and ἕκαστον as being the immediate object 
of διαιρέων. With respect to neither word, 1 believe, is the current 
opinion correct. The phrase ἕκαστον κατὰ φύσιν, which has been misin- 
terpreted in various connections, means ὁ ach after its kind. δὰ e 
shall have to discuss a similar phrase in Empedocles, fr. 110, 5. lhe 
object of διαιρέων, as of διηγεῦμαι, is contained in ὁκοίων, which ἕκαστον 
distributes: “Making trial of such arguments anc facts as I recount, 
distinguishing them each after its own kind and declaring the nat- 
ure of each.” I have rendered ὅκως ἔχει ambiguously with “nature, ; 
for the phrase occurs frequently in Hippocrates where the φύσις of 
things is to be explained, when nothing but the context, and often 
not even that, makes it possible to decide whether φύσις has regard 
primarily to the process of στον τῇ or to the constitution of the thing 
in which the process eventuates. In this fragment the precise imphi- 
cation of ὅκως ἔχει cannot be determined; below (V2 91, 23) in Epi- 
charmus, fr. 4, 6, we shall find an instance of ὡς ἔχει In which the 
process is obviously intended. I referred briefly to this question in 
my Περὶ Φύσεως, p. 126, n. 180 and p. 127, n. 159, and illustrated the 
scientific ideal of dividing and simplifying complex problems by 
distinguishing between classes and individuals, ibid. pp- 123-125. 
Perhaps the most noteworthy text is the following, Hippocr. Περὶ 
διαίτης ὀξέων, 1 (2. 220 1,.), ἀτὰρ οὐδὲ περὶ διαίτης οἱ ἀρχαῖοι ξυνέγραψαν 
οὐδὲν ἄξιον λόγου, καίτοι μέγα τοῦτο παρῆκαν. τὰς μέντοι πολυτροπίας 
τὰς ἐν ἑκάστῃ τῶν νούσων καὶ τὴν πολυσχιδίην αὐτέων οὐκ ἤγνόεον ἔνιοι * 
τοὺς δὲ ἀριθμοὺς ἑκάστου τῶν νουσημάτων σάφα φράζειν ἐθέλοντες, οὐκ ὀρθῶς 
ἔγραψαν" μὴ γὰρ οὐκ εὐαρίθμητον εἴη, εἰ τουτέῳ τις σημανεῖται τὴν τῶν 
καμνόντων νοῦσον, τῷ ἕτερον ἑτέρου διαφέρειν τι, καὶ, ἢν μὴ TWUTO νούσημα 


δοκέῃ εἶναι, μὴ τωὐτὸ οὔνομα ἔχειν. 


V2? 65, 10. Fr. 18, ἐὰν μὴ ἔλπηται, ἀνέλπιστον οὐκ ἐξευρήσει, ἀνεξερεῦ- 


yntov ἐὸν καὶ ἄπορον. 


Here, as in fr. 27, Diels and Nestle translate ἔλπομαι with “hope.” 
Burnet here renders the word with “expect,” there with “look for, 
in either case correctly. J am not sure, however, that he understands 
our fragment as I do. It is well known that ἐλπίς may signify any 
degree of expectation ranging from vague surmise to lively hope or 
fear. In reading this fragment 1 am constantly reminded of a story 
which Tyndall tells of Faraday, who required to be told precisely 
what to look for before observing an experiment which was in prep- 
aration. All scientific observation, whether assisted or not assisted by 








HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 697 


‘arefully controlled experimentation, presupposes an ἐλπίς -- surmise 
or clearly formulated anticipation — of that which observation will 
show. ‘To form such a conception is to exercise the scientific imagina- 
tion, and the findings anticipated assume the shape of a theory or an 
hypothesis. Early Greek philosophy was so prolific of nothing else 
as of hypotheses, and the philosophy of Heraclitus in particular is 
nothing but a bold hypothesis, whatever concrete observations may 
have led him to propound it. Now, that is precisely what I conceive 
our fragment to mean: “ Except a man venture a surmise, he will not 
discover that which he has not surmised; for it ts undiscoverable and 
baffling.” Fr. 123, φύσις κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ, ‘the processes of nature 
are not to be read by him who runs, for the true inwardness of things 
does not appear on the surface’, is probably to be understood in the 
same sense; for ἁρμονίη ἀφανὴς φανερῆς κρείττων (fr. 54). So, too, fr. 86, 
ἀπιστίῃ διαφυγγάνει μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι, probably refers not to faith in a 
dogma or a revelation but to the scientific faith which is the evidence 
of things not seen. 


V? 64,1. Fr. 10, συνάψιες dda καὶ οὐχ ὅλα, συμφερόμενον διαφερό- 
μενον, συνᾷδον διᾷδον, καὶ ἐκ πάντων ἕν καὶ ἐξ ἑνὸς πάντα. 


I do not recall seeing anywhere a reference to the evident reminis- 
cence of this fragment in Seneca, De Otio, 5. 6, utrum contraria inter 
se elementa sint, an non pugnent, sed per diversa conspirent. 

a” 
V? 66,13. Fr. 28, doxedvrwy yap ὁ δοκιμώτατος γινώσκει φυλάσσειν." 
Kal μέντοι Kal δίκη καταλήψεται ψευδῶν τέκτονας Kal μάρτυρας, ὁ 
᾿Εφέσιός φησιν. 


The text of this fragment is regarded by all critics as desperate, 
and desperate measures have been taken to restore it. I have no 
desire to canvass them, but shall offer an interpretation which, with a 
minimal alteration, appears to render it intelligible and quite as 
defensible as the texts obtained by introducing more radical changes. 
First of all, it seems clear that yap is due to Clement, who quotes 
the sentence, and must be set aside as not belonging to Heraclitus. 
This is the view of Bywater, who omits the word. If that be true, 
what is there to hinder our taking δοκεόντων as an imperative? It 
wants a subject, but that was doubtless supplied by the context from 
which the sentence was obviously wrested. A plausible conjecture is 
made possible by the reference in the last clause to the inventors and 
supporters of lies, who are clearly contrasted with those who receive 





698 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


the philosopher’s scornful permission to hold an opinion. If δοκεόντων 
has that meaning, it is transitive as in Herod. 9. 65, δοκέω δέ, εἴ τι 
περὶ τῶν θείων πρηγμάτων δοκέειν δε. Whether we shall read 6 for ὁ 
or assume that 6 was omitted by haplography before o δοκιμώτατος 
΄ς difficult to decide; for, as Diels has remarked, Heraclitus is spar- 
ing in the use of the article. | incline to insert <é>, or possibly <a>, 
the only change I consider necessary in the text. Critics appear to 
consider γινώσκει φυλάσσειν impossible or unintelligible. It is well 
known, however, that of6a and ἐπίσταμαι are used with the infinitive 
vn the sense of “knowing how” to do anything, and in some cases the 
nuance given by these verbs is so slight as to be best disregarded 
in translating the thought into English. [ is difficult to see why 
γινώσκω should not be used in the same construction as οἶδα and 
In fact we have two passages which are calculated to 


ἐπίσταμαι. 
support the assumption that it was so used. Sophocl. Ant. 1087, 


er 


iva 
τὸν θυμὸν οὗτος ἐς νεωτέρους ἀφῇ 
καὶ γνῷ τρέφειν τὴν γλῶσσαν ἡσυχωτέραν. 


Eurip. Bacch., 1341, 
εἰ δὲ σωφρονεῖν 
ἔγνωθ᾽, ὅτ᾽ οὐκ ἠθέλετε, τὸν Διὸς γόνον 
εὐδαιμονεῖτ᾽ ἂν σύμμαχον κεκτημένοι. 


Goodwin, Greek Moods and Tenses, 915, 3 (c), mentions the first 
passage only and takes γιγνώσκω (ἔγνων) in the sense of “learning.” 
The ingressive aorist naturally bears this sense; but it does not ex- 
clude the same construction with the present, as may be seen by 
comparison with ἐπίσταμαι, which shows the same meaning in the 
ingressive aorist, Herod. 3. 15, εἰ δὲ καὶ ἠπιστήθη μὴ πολυπραΎμονεέειν. 
This line of argument would perhaps not suffice to justify a conjec- 
tural introduction of γινώσκει into the text, but it is an adequate 
defense of a MS. reading. We have then to consider the meaning of 
φυλάσσειν. Here we are thrown upon the fragment itself as our only 
resource, since the verb has.a great variety of meanings. ‘There seems 
to be a slight clue in the last clause. Diels appears to be right in 
assuming that Homer, Hesiod, and the like, are the ψευδῶν TEKTOVES 
καὶ μάρτυρες. If this conjecture be true, it is not difficult to see that 
ψευδῶν τέκτονας characterizes them as inventors of lies, and that 
ψευδῶν μάρτυρας can hardly mean those who commit perjury, but 


must rather refer to the witness they bear to falsehoods by recording 











HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 699 


them in their verse. In other words, the woe pronounced upon the 
poets is for originating and perpetuating false views, whether they 
relate to the gods, to the desirability of banishing discord, or what not. 
But φυλάσσειν does bear this precise sense of “perpetuating,” and we 
may be justified in accepting it as referring to the παράδοσις of poetical 
tradition. I think it probable that ὁ δοκιμώτατος refers to Homer as 
the coryphaeus of the group of false teachers of the multitude whom 
Heraclitus is denouncing, and that the epithet signifies nothing more 
than that he is held in the highest esteem, although fr. 57 would per- 
haps rather suggest Hesiod. The subject of δοκεόντων, then, is the 
uncritical multitude, who live according to the tradition of the fathers 
(fr. 74) and may be pardoned for what they do in ignorance, though 
woe shall be unto those through whom offence cometh. Accordingly 
I should translate the fragment rather freely somewhat after this 
manner: “ Ay, let them think as he who is most highly esteemed among 
them contrives to report; but verily, judgment shall overtake those who 
invent and attest falsehoods.” It is hardly necessary to add that 
Heraclitus was not threatening Homer with hell-fire, as Clement 
would have us suppose. 


2 x. δ \ t of , ’ 
V2 68, 11. Fr. 41, ἕν τὸ σοφόν, ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, ὁτέη ἐκυβέρνησε 
πάντα διὰ πάντων. 


Here I accept the text, but not the interpretation of Diels, who 
renders the fragment thus: “In Einem besteht die Weisheit, die 
Vernunft zu erkennen, als welche alles und jedes zu lenken weiss.”’ 
Nestle translates γνώμην with “Geist”; and Burnet, with “thought.” 
In order to arrive at the thought of Heraclitus, it is needful first of all 
to note how in a number of his fragments, which are concerned with 
his conception of true wisdom, he surcharges with meaning the terms 
for knowledge in contradistinction to sense-perception or opinion. 
Fr. 17, οὐ yap φρονέουσι τοιαῦτα πολλοί, ὁκόσοι [so Diels, Ν᾽] ἔγκυρεῦσιν, 
οὐδὲ μαθόντες γινώσκουσιν, ἑωυτοῖσι δὲ δοκέουσι, “The majority of man- 
kind [this, I think must be the meaning of πολλοί, whether or not with 
Bergk we add oi], so far as they meet such problems, do not compre- 
hend them even when instructed, though they think they do.” Fr. 34, 
“They that lack understanding (ἀξύνετοι) hear, but are like unto them 
that are deaf.” Fr. 35, “ Men who are lovers of wisdom must have 
acquired true knowledge of full many matters” (εὖ μάλα πολλῶν 
ἵστορας εἶναι). But Heraclitus is well aware that much instruction 
(cp. μαθόντες, fr. 17) does not impart understanding (fr. 40, πολυμαθίη 
νόον ἔχειν οὐ διδάσκει: ‘Holodov yap ἂν ἐδίδαξε καὶ Πυθαγόρην αὖτίς τε 








700 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


Ξενοφάνεά τε kal Ἑκαταῖον), else would the champions of the new, 
self-styled ἱστορίη and Hesiod, their coryphaeus, have got under- 
standing. ‘The same pregnancy of meaning as in fr. 17 attaches to 
γινώσκειν in fr. 108, to be discussed more at length below, and in fr. 57, 
where Heraclitus says that Hesiod, whom men regard as most knowing, 
did not really comprehend (οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν) day and night; for, contrary 
to his opinion, they are one. It is thus clearly shown that by under- 
standing Heraclitus means a cognitive faculty or act which penetrates 
beyond superficial differences and distinctions, present to sense and 
uncritical fancy, to an inner core of truth, and is characterized by 
the apprehension of a fundamental unity. Again, the same point of 
view finds expression in fr. 56, where he likens mankind, readily duped 
when it comes to a true understanding of the surface show of things 
(ἐξηπάτηνται ot ἄνθρωποι πρὸς THY γνῶσιν τῶν φανερῶν), to Homer, who 
could not read a foolish riddle propounded to him by gamins. Above, 
in discussing fr. 18, I have already touched on fr. 80,ἀπιστίῃ διαφυγγάνει 
μὴ γιγνώσκεσθαι, maintaining that Heraclitus meant to imply that the 
true meaning of things is missed for want of a confident act of imagi- 
native anticipation, whereby that which does not obtrude itself on our 
senses 15 brought home to the understanding. It is perhaps not too 
fanciful to detect the same distinction between sense and under- 
standing, where understanding involves the synthesis of apperception, 
in fr. 97, κύνες yap καταβαὔζουσιν ὧν ἂν μὴ γινώσκωσι. Heraclitus 
would thus be merely repeating the distinction of Alemaeon, fr. 1° 
(V? 103, 25), ἄνθρωπον yap φησι τῶν ἄλλων (se. ζῴων) διαφέρειν ὅτι 
μόνον ξυνίησι, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα αἰσθάνεται μέν, οὐ ξυνίησι δέ. 

Returning now to fr. 41 after a considerable détour, we naturally 
pause again before the phrase ἐπίστασθαι γνώμην, which is the real 
crux. Scholars appear to be fairly unanimous in holding that, whether 
it means “ Vernunft,” “Geist,” or “thought,” γνώμην is an accusative 
of the external object, being, in fact, the divine entity which rules 
the world. Heraclitus ὁ κυκητής does not much encourage fine dis- 
tinctions, but to me this interpretation seems to yield a Stoic rather 
than a Heraclitean thought. In obvious reminiscence of our frag- 
ment and of fr. 32, ἕν τὸ σοφὸν μοῦνον λέγεσθαι οὐκ ἐθέλει Kal ἐθέλει 
Ζηνὸς ὄνομα, Cleanthes, H. in ἴον. 30 could say, 


δὸς δὲ κυρῆσαι 
γνώμης, ἣ πίσυνος σὺ δίκης μέτα πάντα κυβερνᾷς. 


But Cleanthes was clearly writing from a different, and a later, 
point of view, for which the οὐκ ἐθέλει of Heraclitus had no real 











HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 10}1 


significance. Following him and having regard to Antipho Soph. fr. 1 
(V? 591, 18, γνώμῃ γινώσκει, and V? 592, 4, γνώμῃ νῶσαι) one might 
incline to propose to emend γνώμην and read γνώμῃ ἐπίστασθαι in Hera- 
clitus. I should regard that, however, as an error; for I hold that 
γνώμην is an accusative of the inner object. In other words, ἐπίστα- 
σθαι γνώμην is a periphrasis for γινώσκειν. In the time of Heraclitus 
ἐπίστασθαι had not yet acquired the technical sense which it later 
bore in philosophical prose: in fr. 57, τοῦτον ἐπίστανται πλεῖστα εἰδέναι, 
it means to “fancy”; in fr. 19, ἀκοῦσαι οὐκ ἐπιστάμενοι οὐδ᾽ εἰπεῖν, to 
“be skillful.” The latter sense is common from Homer onward, the 
former in Herodotus. It is not surprising, therefore, that Heraclitus 
should wish to reinforce it with a cognate substantive. A similar turn 
recurs in Ion of Chios, fr. 4 (V? 222, 28 sq.), 


ὡς ὁ μὲν ἠνορέῃ TE KEKATMEVOS ἠδὲ Kal αἰδοῖ 
καὶ φθίμενος ψυχῇ τερπνὸν ἔχει βίοτον, 

εἴπερ ἸΠυθαγόρης ἐτύμως ὁ σοφὸς περὶ πάντων 
ἀνθρώπων γνώμας ἤδεε κἀξέμαθεν. 


Here Diels, whose emendation, ἤδεε for εἶδε I heartily approve, 
renders γνώμας ἤδεε κἀξέμαθεν with “ Einsichten erworben und erforscht 
hat.’’ I believe we have a sort of hysteron proteron, and that Ion 
(for, herein differing from Diels, I believe the verses are his) meant 
“if Pythagoras was well informed and really knew whereof he spoke.”’ 
This interpretation of Ion’s phrase is proved correct beyond a doubt 
by Theognis, 59, 


ἀλλήλους δ᾽ ἀπατῶσιν ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλοισι γελῶντες, 
οὔτε κακῶν γνώμας εἰδότες οὔτ᾽ ἀγαθῶν. 


The couplet was reproduced with slight modifications by an unintel- 
ligent imitator, Theognis 1113, 


ἀλλήλους δ᾽ ἀπατῶντες ἐπ᾽ ἀλλήλοισι γελῶσιν, 
οὔτ᾽ ἀγαθῶν μνήμην εἰδότες οὔτε κακῶν. 


Here we must without doubt adopt Hecker’s emendation γνῴμην for 
μνήμην. The imitator did not perceive the true significance of the 
original, which sought to hold up to scorn the blissful Edenic ignor- 
ance of good and evil characteristic of the new-made lords of Megara, 
who but recently, clad in goat-skins, lived like pasturing deer in the 
wilds without the city walls, but now in the city light-heartedly hood- 
wink one another. Clearly γνώμας εἰδέναι is a mere periphrasis for 
εἰδέναι. Asimilar reinforcement of εἰδέναι occurs in the LX X. account 





702 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


of Eden, Gen. 2. 9, τὸ ξύλον τοῦ εἰδέναι γνωστὸν καλοῦ Kal πονηροῦ, 
where, but for the confirmation of the MS. text by Philo Jud. 1. 55, 
27, one might be inclined to suspect that γνωστόν was a corruption of 
γνῶσιν or γνώμην. If Ion’s phrase reminds us of such Homeric locu- 
tions as νοήματα ἤδη (6 121) and μήδεα οἶδε ( 363), we find something 
closely analogous to that of Heraclitus in Plato, Apol. 20 E, od yap δὴ 
ἔγωγε αὐτὴν (se. τὴν σοφίαν) ἐπίσταμαι. In this last phrase, however, 
the comparison with 20 D, κινδυνεύω ταύτην εἶναι σοφός, may suggest 
that Plato had in mind the old force of ἐπίστασθαι, “be skillful.” 
However, Theognis 564, σοφίην πᾶσαν ἐπιστάμενον, has the same 
construction. Cp. ibid. 1157. If, then, we so interpret ἐπίστασθαι 
γνώμην, we cannot take the relative ὁτέη so closely with γνώμην as the 
ordinary view requires. I should rather say that ὁτέη was roughly 
equivalent to ἥ ye, guippe quae, as ὅστις in fr. 57 means ut pote qui, 
and render the fragment somewhat as follows: “One thing only is 
wisdom: to get Understanding: she it is that pervades all things and 
governs all,” 


> 


ν᾽ 69, 2. Fr. 48, τῷ οὖν τόξῳ ὄνομα Bios, ἔργον δὲ θάνατος. 


Diels, Die Anfiinge der Philologie bet den Griechen, Neue Jahrbiicher, 
xxv (1910), I. Abteilung, p. 3, says, “Der Gleichklang der Worte 
βιός (Pfeil) und Bios (Leben) war ihm ein iiusseres Zeichen fiir seine 
Lehre, dass die Gegensiitze Leben and Tod im Grunde eins seien.” 
Zeller I, 640, n. 2, expresses himself in much the same way. I have 
no desire to controvert this interpretation, so far as it goes; but it 
seems to me that the words of Heraclitus imply much more. In δ 
Diels properly refers to Hippocrates, Περὲ τροφῆς, 2 (V? 86, 1 sq.), τροφὴ 
οὐ τροφή, ἢν μὴ δύνηται, ov τροφὴ τροφή, ἢν οἷόν TE ἦ τρέφειν " οὔνομα τροφή, 
ἔργον δὲ οὐχί᾽ ἔργον τροφή, οὔνομα δὲ οὐχίἔ. With this passage of un- 
doubtedly Heraclitean origin we should take fr. 37, sues caeno, cohor- 
tales aves pulvere vel cinere lavari; for the thought apparently is 
that mud and dust are not ὀνόματι water, but are ἔργῳ identical 
withit. Fr. 13, δεῖ yap τὸν χαρίεντα unre ῥυπᾶν μήτε αὐχμεῖν μήτε βορβόρῳ 
χαίρειν καθ᾽ Ἡράκλειτον, where βορβόρῳ χαίρειν alone seems to belong 
to Heraclitus, may conceivably have reference to the same problem, 
the philosopher meaning to imply that we should call things and men 
by names conformable to their ἔργον: by their fruits ye shall know 
them! Plotinus Enn. 1. 6. 6, ἔστι yap δή, ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, καὶ ἡ 
σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ ἀνδρεία καὶ πᾶσα ἀρετὴ κάθαρσις καὶ ἡ φρόνησις αὐτή᾽ διὸ 
καὶ αἱ τελεταὶ ὀρθῶς αἰνίττονται τὸν μὴ κεκαθαρμένον καὶ εἰς [an ἐν] adov 
κείσεσθαι ἐν βορβόρῳ, ὅτι τὸ μὴ καθαρὸν βορβόρῳ διὰ κάκην φίλον οἷα δὴ 








HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 703 


καὶ ves, οὐ καθαραὶ τὸ σῶμα, χαίρουσι τῷ τοιούτῳ, obviously glancing at fr. 
13, suggests the possibility that Heraclitus used the words in connec- 
tion with a discussion of the mysteries, with the intent of which he 
seems to have been satisfied, while he denounced their forms. Thus, 
fr. 5, καθαίρονται δ᾽ ἄλλως αἵματι μιαινόμενοι οἷον εἴ τις πηλὸν ἐμβὰς 
πηλῷ ἀπονίζοιτο, we find a context in which he may have distin- 
guished between the form and the substance, the ὄνομα and the 
ἔργον. Bethat asit may, there is abundant evidence that Heraclitus 
had grasped the fruitful principle that the true nature of a thing is 
to be understood in relation to its function or épyov. We are familiar 
enough with his interest in etymologies, which reveals the desire to 
detect the true meaning of objects in the derivation of their names; 
but the study of homonyms, which our fragment reveals, almost 
necessarily involved a corresponding attention to synonyms, in which 
words of very different origin and etymology are shown to have a 
common meaning. The test of identity or difference of meaning 
Heraclitus found in the ἔργον of the thing. Plato, in a passage clearly 
under the influence of Heraclitus, Crat. 394 A sq., develops this two- 
fold principle, which underlies the study of homonyms and synonyms, 
referring to the law of uniformity in nature, in accordance with which 
like begets like, and concludes therefrom that, as the physician recog- 
nizes drugs by their physiological action (δύναμις = Epyov), not allowing 
himself to be deceived by their several disguises, so the philosopher 
must apply the same name to parent and offspring, or at any rate he 
must learn to detect the identity of concepts by whatever names they 
may go. Plato is obviously developing ideas derived from Heraclitus, 
partly such as are expressed in the fragments above cited, partly 
those of fr. 67, which we shall presently discuss more at length. In 
Tim. 50 A-51 B Plato combines in a highly suggestive way Heracli- 
tean and Eleatic concepts, very much as he develops the law of 
uniformity, mentioned in the Cratylus, into the principle of interac- 
tion (ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν) in Gorg. 476 B sq. In the living tissue of so 
vital a tradition as Greek philosophy presents we expect to find con- 
tinuous developments of this kind. What is more difficult is the task 
of discriminating the stages marked by the individuals who contributed 
to the total result. In regard to the particular question with which 
we are now concerned, it is clear that Heraclitus and the Heracliteans 
laid the foundations for the Socratic procedure of definition by noting 
the essential importance of the ἔργον in determining the meaning of 
a concept. It was Socrates, however, who elaborated the method of 
definition on the basis of dialectic, thus in turn laying the foundations 
of the science of logic. 





704 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


V? 69, 10. Fr. 50, Ἡράκλειτος μὲν οὖν «ἕν» φησιν εἶναι τὸ πᾶν 
διαίρετον ἀδιαίρετον, γενητὸν ἀγένητον, θνητὸν ἀθάνατον, λόγον αἰῶνα, 
πατέρα υἱόν, θεὸν δίκαιον" οὐκ ἐμοῦ, ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμο- 
λογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἕν πάντα εἶναι ὁ Ἡ ρἀάκλειτός φησι. 


It is agreed that the authentic words of He raclitus begin with οὐκ 
éuod: what precedes we owe to Hippolytus, who obviously modeled 
his introductory statement on fr. 67. The comparison of the two 
passages shows that Bergk’s «ἕν», which Diels adopts, 1s unneces- 
sary. The predicates of τὸ πᾶν are, as one sees at a glance, arranged 
in contrasted pairs. In the fourth pair, λόγος is of course the intelhi- 
gible principle, virtually the κόσμος νοητός, opposed to αἰών which 1s 
the κόσμος αἰσθητός. The next pair, πατέρα υἱόν, is of course of Chris- 
tian origin. Apparently the last, θεὸν δίκαιον, has puzzled Professor 
Diels; for he now (V*) proposes to insert [ἄδικον] after δίκαιον. I 
long ago saw that this pair was suggested to Hippolytus or his source 
by Plato, Crat. 412 C-413 D, but had taken for granted that this 
was a matter of common knowledge and not worthy of special notice, 
until Diels’s note undeceived me. I observe that Otto Gilbert, Griech. 
Religionsphilosophie, p. 62, n. 1, also noticed the connection. | He there 
proposes a different interpretation of αἰών, but his suggestion I take 
to be too clearly mistaken to require refutation. In reference to θεὸν 
δίκαιον, it ought to be said that Hippolytus possibly wrote διαϊόν (= 
ἥλιον), and that δίκαιον may be due to the copyist; but there 1s no 
sufficient justification for making a change in the text. Diels is 
probably right in adopting Miller’s εἶναι for the εἰδέναι οἱ Par. ; but 
εἰδέναι may possibly have been originally a gloss on ὁμολογεῖν; for if 
it must be interpreted here, as in fr. 51, with 


ὁμολογεῖν is sound 
“sharing in the (a) common 


reference to Heraclitean etymology, as 


> 


λόγος. 


V2 71,15. Fr. 67, ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμὼν θέρος, πόλεμος ELPTYN, 
οὗτος ὁ vovs), ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ 


κόρος λιμός (τἀναντία ἅπαντα" rat ὁ 
ὅκωσπερ «πῦρ», ὁπόταν συμμιγῇ θυῴμασιν, ὀνομάζεται καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν 
ἑκάστου. 

This is the text of Diels. I hope to make it clear that it is not 
correct, and to show also what Heraclitus wrote and what he meant. 
In order to understand and reconstruct this fragment we must com- 
pare two passages from Plato, in which he obviously alludes to it. 
Crat. 394 A, οὐκοῦν καὶ περὶ βασιλέως ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος ; ἔσται γὰρ ποτε ἐκ 
βασιλέως βασιλεύς, καὶ ἐξ ἀγαθοῦ ἀγαθός, καὶ ἐκ καλοῦ καλός, καὶ τάλλα 





HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 


πάντα οὕτως, ἐξ ἑκάστου γένους ἕτερον τοιοῦτον ἔκγονον, ἐὰν μὴ τέρας 
γένηται: κλητέον δὴ ταὐτὰ ὀνόματα. ποικίλλειν δὲ ἔξεστι ταῖς 
συλλαβαῖς, ὥστε δόξαι ἂν τῷ ἰδιωτικῶς ἔχοντι ἕτερα εἶναι 
ἀλλήλων τὰ αὐτὰ ὄντα" ὥσπερ ἡμῖν τὰ τῶν ἰατρῶν φάρμακα 
χρώμασιν καὶ ὀσμαῖς πεποικιλμένα ἄλλα φαίνεται τὰ αὐτὰ 
ὄντα, τῷ δέγε ἰατρῷ, ἅτε τὴν δύναμιν τῶν φαρμάκων σκο- 
πουμένῳ, τὰ αὐτὰ φαίνεται, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται ὑπὸ τῶν 
προσόντων. οὕτω δὲ ἴσως καὶ ὁ ἐπιστάμενος περὶ ὀνομάτων τὴν δύναμιν 
αὐτῶν σκοπεῖ, καὶ οὐκ ἐκπλήττεται εἴ τι πρόσκειται γράμμα ἢ μετάκειται 
ἢ ἀφήρηται, ἢ καὶ ἐν ἄλλοις παντάπασιν γρἀάμμασίν ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ ὀνόματος 
δύναμις. ὥσπερ ὃ νυνδὴ ἐλέγομεν, “᾿Αστυάναξ᾽᾽ τε καὶ ““Extwp”’ οὐδὲν 
τῶν αὐτῶν γραμμάτων ἔχει πλὴν τοῦ ταῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ὅμως ταὐτὸν σημαίνει. 
καὶ “᾿᾿Αρχέπολίς᾽᾽ γε τῶν μὲν γραμμάτων τί ἐπικοινωνεῖ; δηλοῖ δὲ ὅμως 
τὸ αὐτό" καὶ ἄλλα πολλά ἐστιν ἃ οὐδὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ βασιλέα σημαίνει" καὶ 
ἄλλα γε αὖ στρατηγόν, οἷον “Ayu” καὶ “᾿Πολέμαρχος᾽᾽᾽ καὶ “᾿Εὐπόλε- 
μος. καὶ ἰατρικά γε ἕτερα, “᾿᾿Ιατροκλῆς᾽᾿᾿ καὶ “᾿᾿Ακεσίμβροτος᾽᾽ " καὶ ἕτερα 
ἂν ἴσως συχνὰ εὕροιμεν ταῖς μὲν συλλαβαῖς καὶ τοῖς γράμμασι διαφω- 
νοῦντα, τῇ δὲ δυνάμει ταὐτὸν φθεγγόμενα. The general con- 
nection of this passage with the Heraclitean doctrine of the ἔργον 
was noted above in the discussion of fr. 48. The δύναμις or specific 
physiological action of the drug is compared to the δύναμις of a word, 
its “foree”’ or meaning. The identity of meaning in words that are 
different (διαφωνοῦντα, τἀναντία ἅπαντα), and the methods employed 
to produce variation (ποικίλλειν, ἀλλοιοῦται), ---- these are the themes 
common to Heraclitus and Plato. We naturally think of Heraclitus, 
fr. 15, ὡυτὸς δὲ ᾿Αίδης καὶ Διόνυσος, and fr. 57, ὅστις ἡμέρην Kal εὐφρόνην 
οὐκ ἐγίνωσκεν" ἔστι γὰρ ἕν. The second passage from Plato, to which 
I referred above, is Tim. 49 sq., where the relation of the elements 
to the δεξαμενή or the ἐκμαγεῖον is under discussion. It will suffice 
for our purpose to quote a sentence from 50 E, διὸ καὶ πάντων ἐκτὸς 
εἰδῶν εἶναι χρεὼν TO τὰ πάντα ἐκδεξόμενον ἐν αὑτῷ γένη, καθάπερ περὶ τὰ 
ἀλείμματα ὁπόσα εὐήδη τέχνῃ μηχανῶνται πρῶτον τοῦτ᾽ αὐτὸ ὑπάρχον, 
ποιοῦσιν ὅτι μάλιστα ἀώδη τὰ δεξόμενα ὑγρὰ τὰς ὀσμάς" ὅσοι τε ἔν τισιν 
τῶν μαλακῶν σχήματα ἀπομάττειν ἐπιχειροῦσι, τὸ παράπαν σχῆμα οὐδὲν 
ἔνδηλον ὑπάρχειν ἐῶσι, προομαλύναντες δὲ ὅτι λειότατον ἀπεργάζονται. 
Plato here employs two comparisons to illustrate the relation of the 
substratum to the elemental forms, borrowing one from the manu- 
facture of unguents, the other from the art of moulding figures in a 
matrix. The first of these is obviously similar to that above quoted 
from the Cratylus, and was repeated by Lucret. 2, 847 sq. 





acer 


PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


sicut amaracini blandum stactaeque liquorem 

et nardi florem, nectar qui naribus halat, 

cum facere instituas, cum primis quaerere par est, 
quoad licet ac possis reperire, inolentis olivi 
naturam, nullam quae mittat naribus auram, 
quam minime ut possit mixtos in corpore odores 
concoctosque suo contractans perdere viro, 
propter eandem rem debent primordia rerum 
non adhibere suum gignundis rebus odorem, etc. 


Heeding the suggestions afforded by these passages from Plato and 
Lucretius, which seem to me clearly to reproduce, however freely, 
the thought of Heraclitus in our fragment, It should be possible with 
considerable certainty to restore the text and to determine its meaning. 
It is obvious that in the Cratylus Plato slightly changed the figure, 
substituting drugs for unguents, because of the advantage of thus 
being able to appeal to the expert knowledge of the physician. He 
may have been influenced also by certain Heraclitean elements in 
the medical literature, such as we find in Hippocrates Περὶ διαίτης 
and Περὶ τροφῆς. At all events, it is clear that «πῦρ», which Diels 
has adopted from the conjecture of Dr. Thomas Davidson, and <otvos>, 
which Bergk proposed, are alike inadmissible. The latter part of the 
fragment and the use of θύωμα, which Hesychius defines with μύρον 
and ἄρωμα, point clearly to the conclusion that Heraclitus, as we 
should infer from Plato and Lucretius, referred to an unguent. The 
‘nstances of θύωμα (Herod. 2. 86; Lucian, De Dea S5yra, ὃ and 46) 
refer to unguents. If one or the other of the passages in Lucian 
should be doubtful, there can be no question in regard to Hippocr. 
Γυναικείων B, 209 (8, 404 L.), ἑψεῖν τὰ θυώματα ἃ ἐς TO μύρον ἐμβάλλεται, 
with which compare ibid. 202 (8, 386 L.) and 206 (8, 398 L.) In the 
making of unguents (see Bliimner, Technologie und Terminologie der 
Gewerbe und Kiinsté, 1., 359 sq.), the neutral base, as well as the 
product resulting from the union of aromatic substances with it, was 
called μύρον or ἔλαιον. The finished product bore a variety of names 
determined by the volatile ingredients. Theophrastus, Περὶ ὀσμῶν, 
gives ample information, from which we may quote a few sentences. 
V. 25, πρὸς ἕκαστον δὲ τῶν μύρων ἐμβάλλουσι τὰ πρόσφορα τῶν ἀρωμά- 
των, οἷον εἰς μὲν τὴν κύπρον καρδάμωμον, ἀσπάλαθον ἀναφυράσαντες 
τῷ εὐὠδει. VI. 27, ἅπαντα δὲ συντίθενται τὰ μύρα τὰ μὲν ἀπ᾽ ἀνθῶν 

δὲ ἀπὸ φύλλων τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ κλωνὸς τὰ δ᾽ ἀπὸ ῥίζης τὰ δ᾽ ἀπὸ ξύλων 

δ᾽ ἀπὸ καρποῦ τὰ δ᾽ ἀπὸ δακρύων. μικτὰ δὲ πάνθ᾽ ὡς εἰπεῖν. In inten- 


HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 107 


tion, therefore, the conjecture of Bernays, συμμιγῇ «θύωμα θυώμασι, 
was better than either of those which we noticed above; but Diels 15 
right in assuming that the desiderated word is to be supplied after 
ὅκωσπερ. The only point in favor of «πῦρ!» is that its omission can 
so easily be explained; but with almost equal ease we can account for 
the loss of «μύρον;», which is obviously required by the sense and by 
the Platonic and Lucretian parallels. 

But we must now return to the earlier part of the fragment. The 
words τἀναντία ἅπαντα᾽ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς have been a stumbling-block. 
Bywater and Diels bracket them, since they can make nothing of 
them. Mullach accomplished the same result by making two frag- 
ments instead of one, and omitting the troublesome words. But a 
reference to the passage from the Cratylus should prove beyond 
question that they belong just where they stand; only one slight 
change is required, viz, ὡυτὸς for οὗτος, as Bergk perceived. He says, 
Kleine Philol. Schriften, 11. 86, n. 4, “Ceterum etiam verba illa 
τἀναντία ἅπαντα, οὗτος ὁ νοῦς non interpretis, sed ipsius Heracliti esse 
existimo, quae ita videntur corrigenda: ὁ θεὸς ... κόρος, τἀναντία 
ἅπαντα" ωὑτὸς νόος" ἀλλοιοῦται δέ, ὅκωσπερ οἶνος krA.”’ Unfortunately 
Bergk did not interpret his proposed text; but judging by his punc- 
tuation and the absence of any remark about the force of νόος, I 
venture to suggest that what he had in mind was something like this: 
“Gott ist... Uberfluss und Hunger, mit einem Worte, alle Gegen- 
siitze. Es ist derselbe Geist,” usw. If this suggestion does him 
justice, it will be seen that he did not really anticipate my ptoposal 
except in regard to the change of οὗτος into wi7és; and w orking with 
the text of Diels, who did not even record the proposal, I did not 
come upon his emendation until I had reached the same conclusion 
independently and by a different route. As a matter of fact, it was 
the passage from the Cratylus which disclosed the connection of 
ideas and led me to the obviously correct text and interpretation; 
for I saw at once that νοῦς had no reference whatever to θεός and 
did not mean “Geist,” but, as in Herod. 7. 162, οὗτος δὲ ὁ νόος τοῦ 
ῥήματος, signified “sense” or “meaning.” But, this point once cleared 
up, it followed at once that we must read quros for οὗτος, and that 
τἀναντία ἅπαντα did not merely add a generalization to sum up the 
bill of particulars which precedes. In short, τἀναντία ἅπαντα is the 
plural form of τοὐναντίον ἅπαν, which occurs, Plato, Polit. 310 D, asa 
variant for the more usual phrase πᾶν τοὐναντίον; ep. Xen. Mem, 
3.12. 4 and (for the adverbial force of πᾶς or ἅπας) Plato. Protag. 


317 B. 








708 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


Restoring to Heraclitus what rightfully belongs to him, we should 
therefore write the fragment thus: ὁ θεὸς ἡμέρη εὐφρόνη, χειμὼν θέρος, 
πόλεμος εἰρήνη, κόρος λιμός" τἀναντία ἅπαντα, ὡυτὸς ὁ νοῦς " ἀλλοιοῦται δὲ 
ὅκωσπερ «μύρον», ὁπόταν συμμιγῇ θυώμασιν, ὀνομάζεται καθ᾽ ἡδονὴν ἑκά- 
στου. “God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, satiety 
and hunger,— opposites quite, but the sense is the same; he changes, 
however, just as the neutral base employed in making unguents, when it 
is mixed with volatile essences, receives a name in accordance with the odor 
of each.” 

In regard to the philosophical interpretation of the fragment, which 
thus assumes a rank of capital importance for the thought of Heracli- 
tus, it is hardly necessary to say more at present, than that we must 
henceforth build upon the foundations laid by Plato, Tim. 48 E-52 C. 
Plato and Lucretius prove that the same thought lay at the core of the 
atomic theory, and it is evident that Heraclitus here touched one of 
the basic conceptions of metaphysics in so far as it is concerned with 
the relation of the One and the Many. We are therefore called upon 
to consider the questions which crowd upon us with sobriety and 
‘areful discrimination, unless we are to efface the mile-stones that 
mark the progress of speculation. Such an inquiry is, however, too 
far-reaching to admit of discussion in this connection. 


V? 72,18. Fr. 71, μεμνῆσθαι δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἐπιλανθανομένου ἣ ἡ ὁδὸς ἄγει. 


The meaning, apparently missed by some scholars, is made clear 
by fr. 117, οὐκ ἐπαΐων ὅκῃ βαίνει. He forgets whither he vs going. 


V? 73,14. Fr. 77, ψυχῇσι.. . . τέρψιν ἢ θάνατον ὑγρῇσι γενέσθαι. 


It seems very probable that we are here dealing, if one may so 
express it, with a conflate text; that is to say, two utterances of 
Heraclitus, otherwise essentially identical, but differing in this, that 
one related to τέρψις, the other to θάνατος, appear to have been merged 
in one. Either statement, taken by itself, is entirely intelligible; 
but it is improbable that Heraclitus combined them in the manner of 
this ‘fragment.’ 


V? 73, 19. Fr. 78, ἦθος yap ἀνθρώπειον μὲν οὐκ ἔχει γνώμας, θεῖον 
δὲ ἔχει. 


The word ἦθος is difficult and improbable. I suspect that we should 
write ἔθνος; cp. Eurip. Orest. 976, 





HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 709 


ἰὼ iw, πανδάκρυτ᾽ ἐφαμέρων 
ἔθνη πολύπονα. 


The iambic movement of the fragment is obvious, and the position of 
μὲν appears somewhat forced. One is tempted to write the sentence 
as verse, 

ἔθνος μὲν ἀνθρώπειον οὐ γνώμας EXEL, 

θεῖον δ᾽ ἔχει. 


This may, of course, be nothing more than the work of chance; but 
the entire cast of the sentence suggests that we are dealing with verse 
converted into prose. Now we know that there were those who 
versified the philosophy of Heraclitus. One of their number, Scythi- 
nus, a writer of the fourth century, is known by name; and one of the 
fragments of Scythinus (fr. 2, ν᾽ 86, 22 sq.) has come down to us 
reconverted into prose, which Wilamowitz has again rendered in 
verse. I do not suggest, though it is possible, that we have before us 
another reconverted version of Heraclitus by Scythinus; for the cases 
of Cleanthes, whose Stoic verses are in part little more than para- 
phrases of Heraclitus, and of ‘Epicharmus,’ among whose fragments 
there are some which reproduce the thought of Heraclitus as others 
do that of Plato, caution us to avoid hasty conclusions. Neverthe- 
less, I incline to think that fr. 78 is in fact a thinly disguised prose 
rendering of a verse original; for there are at least two other ‘frag- 
ments’ of Heraclitus (80 and 100) whose form suggests a versified 
original. As it is best to discuss them separately, I will add only 
that one of them, like fr. 78, is quoted by Origen Agaznst Celsus. If 
my suggestion be approved by scholars, an interesting question 
arises, to wit, how accurately the versifier, if he was actually trying 
to reproduce the thought of Heraclitus, as Celsus or his source sup- 
posed, succeeded in rendering it. In the case of fr. 78, it 1s a nice 
question whether Heraclitus would have said what is here imputed 
to him. Origen seems to be clearly right in interpreting γνώμας with 
σοφία; but Heraclitus, whose doctrine of τὸ σοφόν we considered above 
in the note on fr. 41, although unsparing in his denunciation of the 
stupidity of the crowd, clearly believed that he had attained to 
wisdom. We naturally think of him as declaring with the Hebrew 
prophet that he alone was left. 

We may note that fr. 78 seems to have served as a model for the 
spurious fragment of Epicharmus, 57, 7, which Diels (V2 99, 4) writes 
thus: 


9 \ ld / b e « ᾿ \ , 
οὐ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος τέχναν τιν᾽ εὗρεν, ὁ δὲ θεὸς TOTAL. 





710 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMFRICAN ACADEMY. 


In the same way Epicharmus, fr. 64 (V? 100, 5 sq.), likewise spurious, 


᾿ ᾿ ; . © \ U ‘an o> t ; ’ , 
εἰμι VEKPOS* VEKPOS OE KOT POS, YN ὁ KOT POS ἐστιν" 
9 b J e o~ ld b J ’ , ; , ‘ , 
εἰ δ᾽ ἡ γῆ θεὸς ἐστ᾽, οὐ νεκρός, ἀλλὰ θεός, 


glances at Heraclitus, fr. 96, νέκυες γὰρ κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι, and also at 
the anecdotes relative to the manner of his death, V? 54, 29 sq., and 
to the anecdote about the oven, where also there were gods (V2 58, 
36 sq.). It seems altogether likely that the case of Heraclitus is in 
this a close parallel to that of Pythagoras, that myth soon began to 
weave legends about his name, and that forgeries sprang up which were 
supported by other forgeries. For the relation of the late Pytha- 
goreans to Heraclitus, see Norden, Agnostos Theos, p. 345, n. 1. The 
examples given above and to be discussed presently make it extremely 
probable that some of these were written in verse and current as 
adespota, becoming in time attached to various names, such as Epi- 
charmus. Others went under the name of Heraclitus, and it is 
probably to them that the Vita in Suidas refers (V2 56, 46), ἔγραψε 
πολλὰ ποιητικῶς. 


2 Dr, a ) b ; ‘ ᾿ ‘ Ul sr Ul ‘oF 

V* 73, 23. Fr. 80, εἰδέναι δὲ χρὴ τὸν πόλεμον ἐόντα ξυνόν, Kal δίκην 
᾿" ἃ Ul ’ > “ἢ 4 , 
ἔριν, καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ᾽ ἔριν Kal χρεώμενα. 


his fragment has been discussed times innumerable, more particu- 
larly with reference to the last word, which is conceded to be im- 


possible. If the sentence be regarded as an authentic prose fragment 
of Heraclitus, we probably cannot do better than accept Schuster’s 
conjecture, καταχρεώμενα for χρεώμενα, and take it as complementary to 
γινόμενα. Diels, however, has rightly refused to admit into his text 
any of the numerous substitutes proposed for χρεώμενα. First of all 


it should be noted that καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ᾽ ἔριν does not look so 
much like an utterance of Heraclitus as like an attempt to summarize 
details; this impression is confirmed by fr. 8, Arist. Eth. Nic. 1155” 4, 
Ἡράκλειτος τὸ ἀντίξουν συμφέρον καὶ ἐκ τῶν διαφερόντων καλλίστην ἁρμο- 
νίαν καὶ πάντα Kar’ ἔριν γίνεσθαι, which is itself quite obviously not a 
verbatim quotation but a summary. Long ago I was struck by the 
similarity in thought between καὶ δίκην ἔριν, καὶ γινόμενα πάντα Kar’ 
ἔριν and Cleanthes, H. in Jovy. 36, 


δὸς δὲ κυρῆσαι γνώμης, ἣ πίσυνος σὺ δίκης μέτα πάντα κυβερνᾷς, 


and in a letter to Professor Diels I proposed instead of χρεώμενα to 
read χρεὼν μέτα, after Eurip. Here. F. 20, 





HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 711 


εἴθ᾽ Ἥρας ὕπο 
κέντροις δαμασθεὶς εἴτε τοῦ χρεὼν μέτα. 


He replied that the anastrophe of μέτα was impossible in prose. 
This is of course true, as I well knew, assuming that we are dealing 
with real prose. At that time, having nothing more definite than the 
vague impression that the diction and movement of certain fragments 
of Heraclitus were distinctly poetic, and the statement in the Vita of 
Suidas, which I then interpreted as referring in a general way to 
poetic diction, I dropped the matter, though I still felt that χρεὼν μέτα 
was probably the true reading. Recently Dr. Bruno Jordan, Archiv 
fiir Gesch. der Philos., 24 (1911), p. 480, has independently made the 
same suggestion. In view of the probability that in this ‘fragment,’ 
as in fr. 78, we have a versified version of Heraclitus reconverted into 
prose, I regard my emendation as all but certain. I do not think it 
feasible to recover the verse original throughout, because, as I indi- 
‘ated above, καὶ γινόμενα πάντα κατ᾽ ἔριν appears to be a summarizing 
formula; but it is easy to pick out parts of the sentence which fall 
almost without change into iambic verse: 


εἰδέναι δὲ χρή 
τὸν πόλεμον ὄντα ξυνόν 
καὶ δίκην ἔριν 
. «τοῦ; χρεὼν μέτα. 


It must be said that the text of the fragment is not absolutely certain, 
as the Mss. of Origen Against Celsus read εἰ δὲ χρή and δίκην ἐρεῖν; 
but the emendations adopted by Diels and reproduced above are so 
obvious that we may with confidence make his text the basis of our 
study. Regarded in the light of the poetic tags which have just been 
noted, we have again a close parallel to the prose paraphrase of 
Seythinus, fr. 2; but I hazard no guess as to the author of the versi- 
fied version. 


V? 76, 12. Fr. 100, ὥρας αἱ πάντα φέρουσι. 


This fragment is preserved by Plutarch, who again alludes to it. 
The movement is clearly dactylic, and one may suspect that it formed 
part of an hexameter, though its brevity forbids dogmatic conclusions. 
In view of the experiments of Cleanthes it is not improbable that there 
were versions of certain Heraclitean sayings in heroic verse. It is, of 
course, possible that this fragment owes its rhythmical or metrical 
form to chance or to unconscious poetical influences not unnatural 





712 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


in the early stages of prose when verse was still the prevailing medium 
of artistic expression. This is perhaps the most probable explanation 
of the hexameter ending of fr. 5, θεοὺς οὐδ᾽ ἥρῶας οἵτινές εἰσι, which I 
noted long ago and find referred to Homeric influence by Norden, 
Agnostos Theos, p. 88, π. 1. Dactylic movement, due to epic models, 
is much more easily thus accounted for than iambic or trochaic, such 
as have been noted above in fragments 78 and 80. Of the latter sort 
there is perhaps another example in fr. 120, quoted by Strabo, ἠοῦς 
καὶ ἑσπέρας τέρματα ἡ ἄρκτος Kal ἀντίον THs ἄρκτου οὖρος αἰθρίου Διός. 
The general trochaic or iambic rhythm is at once apparent, and the 
close at least is faultless and strikingly suggestive of a trochaic verse. 
See infra, p. 714 sq. One may recast it into trochaics quite as easily 
as Wilamowitz did the second fragment of Scythinus, — 


ἠοῦς [possibly ἕω dé] χἀσπέρας 
τέρματ᾽ ἄρκτος κἀντί᾽ ἄρκτου οὖρος αἰθρίου Διός. 


V? 77,11. Fr. 108, ὁκόσων λόγους ἤκουσα, οὐδεὶς ἀφικνεῖται ἐς τοῦτο, 
ὥστε γινώσκειν ὅτι σοφόν ἐστι πάντων κεχωρισμένον. 


This fragment has been much discussed; ep. Schuster, pp. 42, 44; 
Zeller, 1. 629, n. 1. Gomperz proposed to bracket ὅτι σοφόν κτλ. as an 
interpolation. All those who retain the words regard them as an 
object clause, whatever interpretation they may put upon it. Diels 


identifies (τὸ) σοφόν with God, and understands the fragment as de- 
claring the divine transcendence. This view has naturally provoked 
vigorous protests; for it is incompatible with all that we otherwise 
know of the thought of Heraclitus. I think λόγους is here used as 
Heraclitus uses λόγος of his own philosophic message or gospel: it 
refers to the Weltanschauungen of the great teachers and_philoso- 
phers; for ἤκουσα does not necessarily refer to actual hearing of the 
person who sets forth his views, but includes the reading (by himself 
or by a slave) of written records. The pregnant force of γινώσκειν was 
sufficiently explained above in the discussion of fr. 41. Heraclitus, 
then, says: “Of all those whose message regarding the nature of things 
at has been my fortune to learn about, not one has attained to the point 
of true knowledge.’’ So much seems to be clear from a survey of the 
conception of knowledge which he is continually proclaiming. But, 
once we seize the import of his use of γινώσκειν, it is equally clear that 
ὅτι is not “that”; it is causal, and the obvious conclusion to his 
sentence follows: “for wisdom is far removed from all” (“men” or 
“of them’’). One may illustrate this use of κεχωρισμένον by a pas- 


HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 713 


sage from Cleanthes quoted by Sext. Empir. 9. 90, ὥστε οὐ τέλειον 
ζῷον ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀτελὲς δὲ Kal πολὺ κεχωρισμένον τοῦ Tedeiov. The 
questionable fragment of Philolaus, quoted by Diels, and the quotation 
from Philostratus ap. Euseb. P. E. 4. 13, ἑνί τε ὄντι καὶ κεχωρισμένῳ 
πάντων, made by Norden, Agnostos Theos, 39, ἢ. 3, afford but weak 
support for so unlikely a theory as that of Diels. In printing the 
fragment, I should place a colon between γινώσκειν and ὅτι. ‘The sen- 
tence thus furnishes a new illustration of the difficulty, noted by 
Aristotle, of phrasing Heraclitus. Diels mentions, but does not adopt, 
my interpretation in γ᾽. 


Vv? 77,19. Fr. 112, σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μεγίστη, καὶ σοφίη ἀληθέα λέγειν 
μ ] ῆ 
καὶ ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ἐπαΐοντας. 


The Mss. here, as in fr. 116, show σωφρονεῖν. Diels here substitutes 
τὸ φρονεῖν, there φρονεῖν, in order to adapt the diction to that of He- 
raclitus. He renders: “Das Denken ist der grésste Vorzug, und die 
Weisheit besteht darin, die Wahrheit zu sagen und nach der Natur zu 
handeln, auf sie hinhérend.”’ Besides changing σωφρονεῖν to τὸ φρονεῖν, 
he gives a forced rendering of ἀρετή and ératovras which serves to 
conceal the obvious Stoic character of the saying. Again, there is no 
other instance of σοφίη in the supposedly genuine fragments of 
Heraclitus, who seems to have used (τὸ) σοφόν instead: it does recur 
in fr. 129, which Diels reckons doubtful or spurious but others accept 
as genuine. Yet, granting that it is genuine, σοφίη there means some- 
thing very different: it is, like πολυμαθείη and xaxorexvin, a term 
of reproach. One who reads the sentence without bias will readily 
admit that ἀρετὴ means an ethical virtue. As for ἀληθέα λέγειν, one 
may perhaps defend it by citing the denunciation of the ψευδῶν τέκτονας 
καὶ μάρτυρας in fr. 28; but it is doubtful whether so obviously an 
ethical virtue would have counted as a mark of σοφίη in the days 
of Heraclitus. In opposition to this it may be said that ᾿Αλήθεια was 
the ideal of the Greek philosophers from the beginning. ‘True; but it 
was objective Truth which they sought, and not the virtue of truth- 
fulness. The juxtaposition of ἀληθέα λέγειν and ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν 
does not suggest a reference to abstract or objective truth. Finally, 
ποιεῖν κατὰ φύσιν ératovras bears all the marks of Stoic doctrine; for 
it is hardly defensible to render ératovras with “auf sie hinhérend.”’ 
The word has here, as in fr. 117, οὐκ ἐπαΐων ὅκῃ βαίνει, the sense which 
it regularly bears in Plato, to wit, “knowing”’; cp. Xen. Mem. 1. 1.9, 
δαιμονᾶν δὲ Kai τοὺς μαντευομένους ἃ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις οἱ θεοὶ μαθοῦσι 
διακρίνειν. The words then clearly mean “to act in accordance with 























714 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


nature consciously and with full knowledge.” This thought is, however, 
in substance and in form entirely Stoic, corresponding in the ethical 
sphere to the injunction to submit willingly to Fate, in the religious 
sphere, as expressed in Cleanthes’s lines to Fate. One may, of course, 
discover the germs of this view in genuine fragments of Heraclitus; 
but Diels’s alterations in the text and his interpretation do not meet 


the reasonable objections long since urged by others to the genuine- 
ness of this fragment. 


ν 78, 8. Fr. 


σωφρονεῖν. 


L116, ἀνθρώποισι πᾶσι μέτεστι γινώσκειν ἑωυτοὺς καὶ 


This fragment, like the preceding, is derived from Stobaeus, and 
like it, too, has been by many regarded as spurious. As I have al- 
ready stated, Diels writes φρονεῖν for σωφρονεῖν, in order to meet an 
obvious criticism. This procedure would be justifiable, however, only 
if the passage as a whole created a presumption in favor of Heracli- 
tean authorship, which is supported solely by the lemma of Stobaeus. 
In fact all indications point to the period after Socrates. Whoever 
attributed the saying to Heraclitus doubtless did so in view of fr. 101 ; 
ἐδιξησάμην ἐμεωυτόν, but the interpretation of the Delphic γνῶθι σαυτόν 
as an injunction to recognize one’s limitations and to occupy oneself 
with that which lies within one’s proper scope and power,— this is, 
so far as we know, Socratic: he who would claim it for Heraclitus 
must assume the burden of proof. But no unbiased reader of our 
fragment will doubt that γινώσκειν ἑωυτοὺς καὶ σωφρονεῖν was intended 
to express that precise thought. I cannot justify the changing of 
σωφρονεῖν to φρονεῖν, and cannot accept the fragment as genuine, 
Bywater was clearly right in marking both 112 and 116 as doubtful. 
Since they come to us from Stobaeus, who quotes them under widely 
different heads, it is plain that their assignment to Socrates is not 
due to a mere mistake in the lemmata of his text, but the error 
must be charged to his sources. 


V’ 78,16. Fr. 120, ἠοῦς Kai ἑσπέρας τέρματα ἡ ἄρκτος Kal ἀντίον τῆς 
ἄρκτου οὖρος αἰθρίου Διός. 


In V* Diels briefly notes my interpretation of οὖρος αἰθρίου Διός as 
“wind of heaven,” which was proposed in my review of his Herakleitos 
von E'phesos*, in Class. Philol., 5. p. 247; but he appears still to prefer 
his own suggestion that Heraclitus referred to Mt. Olympus. As I 
regard my proposal as almost certainly right, I offer here a few addi- 





HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. {10 


tional observations to supplement my former statement, which exi- 
gencies of space then compelled me to omit. For the meaning of 
οὖρος, “wind,” I would refer to Schmidt’s Synonymilk. See also 
Bonitz, Index Aristotelicus, 5. v. ἄρκτος. It was common to say 
Kal πρὸς ἄρκτον καὶ πρὸς νότον. ‘The phrases employed by Herodotus 
in speaking of the cardinal points are especially interesting; I have 
made a complete list of them, and they seem to me to be decisive. 
J will refer, however, to but a few by way of illustration: 1. 148, 
πρὸς ἄρκτον τετραμμένος... πρὸς ζέφυρον ἄνεμον ; 2. ὃ, φέρον ἀπ᾿ ἄρκτου 
πρὸς μεσεμβρίης τε καὶ νότου; 3. 102, πρὸς ἄρκτου τε καὶ βορέου ἀνέμου. 
Cp. Hesiod, Theog. 378-82. . | 

Though I do not accept the suggestion of Diels that the οὖρος Διός 
is Mt. Olympus, I will refer to a passage which might possibly be 
used to support it, to wit, Hippocr. Περὶ ἑβδομάδων, 48 (9. 462 L.), 
Definitio autem superiorum partium et inferiorum corporis umbilicus. 
It would be interesting to know the Greek text: perhaps Helmreich 
or some other ransacker of medical manuscripts may yet recover 
it! It occurs in a part of the treatise much discussed of late; see 
Roscher, Uber Alter, Ursprung und Bedeutung der hippokr. Schrift 
von der Siebenzahl, p. 37, n. 67, who of course, in relating this to his 
“Weltkarte,” refers to the dudados γῆς or θαλάττης, and believes that 
the writer had in mind (not Delphi, but) Delos or Teos. Mt. Olympus 
might well serve as a landmark to divide the “upper”’ or northern 
parts of the earth from the ‘lower’ or southern; but it does not 
seem so suitable fora zero meridian. I doubt, moreover, whether Hera- 
clitus had any “Greenwich” in mind: what he seems to have meant 
is merely this, that “east”? and “west” are relative terms and are 
delimited by a north and south line drawn through any point that 
may bein question. Various special meridians, useful to the geog- 
rapher and mariner, were recognized at a comparatively early date, 
as may be seen from Herodotus; but a zero meridian, 80 far as I 
know, was not thought of before the time of the Alexandrian geogra- 
phers. For the suggestion of a possible verse original for the fragment, 
see above on fr. 100. This would readily account for the use of οὖρος 
in the sense of wind. 

V? 80,10. Fr. 128, δαιμόνων ἀγάλμασιν εὔχονται οὐκ ἀκούουσιν, ὥσπερ 

ἀκούοιεν, οὐκ ἀποδιδοῦσιν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀπαιτοῖεν. 
In regard to the text of this spurious fragment I agree with Diels, 


except that I would set a colon after ἀκούοιεν; from his interpreta- 
tion I dissent, because it seems to me obviously at fault. In some 





(16 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


unaccountable way he appears to have overlooked my note in Class. 
Philol. 5. p. 247, for he renders the text thus: “Sie beten zu den Got- 
terbildern, die nicht héren, als ob sie Gehér hatten, die nichts zuriick- 
geben, wie sie ja auch nichts fordern kénnten,” The saying is a close 
parallel to fr. 127, likewise spurious, in that it charges men with in- 
consistency in their dealings with the gods. Hence οὐκ ἀποδιδοῦσιν 
(= ἀποδιδόασιν; not the partic.!) answers to εὔχονται as ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀπαι- 
Tovey answers to ὥσπερ ἀκούοιεν, and the meaning, as I said in my 
former note, is: “ They make vows to the images of the gods, that hear 
not, as if they heard; they pay not their vows, as if they (the gods) 
required it not.”” Everyone can supply the necessary classical examples 
tor εὔχονται, ἀποδιδοῦσιν, and ἀπαιτοῖεν. I will quote one from the 
LAX, Deuter. 23. 21, ἐὰν δὲ εὔχῃ εὐχὴν κυρίῳ τῷ θεῷ σου, οὐ χρονιεῖς 
ἀποδοῦναι αὐτήν, ὅτι ἐκζητῶν ἐκζητήσει κύριος ὁ θεός σου, καὶ ἔσται ἐν σοὶ 
ἁμαρτία. 


‘Hippocrates. | 


V? 81, 36—82, 16. For this passage, see my Antecedents of Greek 
Corpuscular Theories, Harvard Studies in Class. Philol., 22 (191 1), 
p. 148 sq. It is to this article, and not to “Class. Philol. 22. 
158,” that Diels should have referred V* 106, 16, note. 


c.13. Epicharmus. 
V7 91, 38. Fr. 4:6, 


\ \ ‘ 4 , fos > e ” 
TO δὲ σοφὸν a φύσις τόδ᾽ οἶδεν ὡς ἔχει 
μόνα " πεπαίδευται γὰρ αὐταύτας ὕπο. 


Diels renders, “ Doch wie sich’s mit dieser Weisheit verhiilt, das 
weiss die Natur allein. Denn sie hat’s ganz von selbst gelernt.” 
It is, perhaps, a matter of no great consequence, but I believe his 
translation rests on a misconception of τὸ σοφὸν τόδε and ὡς ἔχει. As 
to the former, it has little in common with (τὸ) σοφόν of Heraclitus, 
but, like the familiar phrase οὐδὲν ποικίλον οὐδὲ σοφόν, denotes some- 
thing recondite or cunningly devised. In regard to ὡς ἔχει, 1 remarked 
above, in my note on Heraclitus, fr. 1, that it here refers to the process 
of becoming, “how it comes about.” The words of the fragment 
mean, “Nature alone knows the secret of this cunning device, or 
the way in which this mysterious result is brought about.’’ This use 
of ws ἔχει and related phrases appears to have escaped many scholars, 
Possibly it baffled the copyists also in certain instances. Thus Xen. 
Mem. 1. 1. 11, οὐδὲ γὰρ περὶ τῆς τῶν πάντων φύσεως, ἧπερ τῶν ἄλλων 


HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 717 


οἱ πλεῖστοι, διελέγετο σκοπῶν, ὅπως ὁ καλούμενος ὑπὸ τῶν σοφιστῶν 
κόσμος ἔχει, καὶ τίσιν ἀνάγκαις ἕκαστα γίνεται τῶν οὐρανίων κτὰ. Here 
the Mss. are divided between ἔχει and ἔφυ, and the editors find it dif- 
ficult to decide. I believe that ἔχει, which has the better credentials, 
is the true reading, though one may question whether the unfamiliar 
force of ἔχει or the similarity of sound led to the substitution of ἔφυ. 
As I pointed out in my study Περὶ Φύσεως, the same duplicity as 
appears in the force of ὡς ἔχει occurs also in the use of φύσις, which 
predominantly signifies that which a thing is, but, pursuant to a 
constant habit of the human mind, is most frequently and naturally 
defined by recounting the story of its birth. 


c. 18. Parmenides. 


V2 105, 34. Diog. L. 9. 22, γένεσιν ἀνθρώπων ἐξ ἡλίου πρῶτον γενέ- 
σθαι: αὐτὸν δὲ ὑπάρχειν τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρόν, ἐξ ὧν τὰ 


πάντα συνεστάναι. 


Various proposals have been made for the emendation οἱ ἡλίου, of 
which ἰλύος is the most probable. It is obvious, however, that ἐξ 
ἡλίου, or whatever we may substitute for it, was not intended to 
denote the elemental constituents of man, since they are expressly 
mentioned later in the sentence. If the writer had in mind merely 
the source of the force which led to the origin of man, ἐξ ἡλίου, 
however singular, may be allowed to stand. But Diels is quite right 
in regarding αὐτὸν as corrupt. The language of Aristotle and his 
commentators suggests the obvious correction, αὐτοῖς δ᾽ ἐνυπάρχειν, 


referring to the στοιχεῖα ἐνυπάρχοντα. 


V? 116,10. Fr. 1, 28, 
χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι 
ἠμὲν ᾿Αληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμὲς ἦτορ 
ἠδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθής. 


Something depends upon the precise meaning of πίστις ἀληθής; for it 
must to a considerable extent determine our conception of the attitude 
of Parmenides toward the βροτῶν δόξαι, which seem to have occu- 
pied his thought in much the larger part of his philosophical poem. 
The phrase recurs, fr. 8, 26 sq., 


αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πείρασι δεσμῶν 

ἔστιν ἄναρχον ἄπαυστον, ἐπεὶ γένεσις καὶ ὄλεθρος 
n " Ϊ ’ « nn a“. ἢ ᾿ , 

τῆλε μάλ᾽ ἐπλάχθησαν, ἀπῶσε OE πίστις ἀληθής. 








PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 
Diels renders it with “ verlissliche Wahrheit” and “wahre Uberzeu- 
gung”; Burnet and Nestle do not vary the phrase but give “true 
belief”? and “des Wahren Gewissheit” in both cases. Two other 
passages of the poem ought to be compared, to wit, fr. 8, 12, 


yar 


οὐδὲ ποτ᾽ ἐκ μὴ ἐόντος ἐφήσει πίστιος ἰσχύς 
γίγνεσθαί τι παρ᾽ αὐτό, 


and fr. 8, 17, 
ov yap ἀληθής 
ἔστιν ὁδός. 


In the passage last mentioned ἀληθὴς ὁδός is clearly equivalent to 
᾿Αληθείης ὁδός, as in fr. 4, 4 we have Πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος. So in 
Sophocl. O. R. 500, 


5 


ὅτι μάντις πλέον ἢ ᾿γὼ φέρεται, 


ἀνδρῶν ὃ 
ὐ 


κρίσις οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής, 


where the meaning obviously is that “there is no proving the truth 
of the contention that a seer outstrips me.’”’ This use of κρίσις calls 
to mind the fact that Parmenides employs the same word, fr. 8, 15, 


[1 Δ ΟΥ Ὁ 


ἢ δὲ κρίσις περὶ τούτων ἐν τῷδ᾽ ἔστιν 

ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν " κέκριται δ᾽ οὖν, ὥσπερ ἀνάγκη, 

τὴν μὲν ἐὰν ἀνόητον ἀνώνυμον (οὐ γὰρ ἀληθής 

ἔστιν ὁδός), τὴν δ᾽ ὥστε πέλειν καὶ ἐτήτυμον εἶναι. 
Here the context appears to me to furnish the clue to the meaning of 
πίστις; tor Parmenides clearly has in mind an action at law in which 
the issue is sharply drawn and judgment is rendered. So fr. 8, 27 sq. 
the πίστις ἀληθής sends γένεσις and ὄλεθρος into banishment. The 
juxtaposition of κρίσις and πίστις shows that πίστις means such evi- 
dence or proof as may be adduced in court, a meaning which the 
word quite regularly bore in legal argumentation. Aristotle, the logi- 
cian, feeling that forensic oratory employed the enthymeme rather 
than the syllogism, and that in consequence its deductions were 
less cogent, continued to use πίστις for rhetorical proof in contradis- 
tinction to ἀπόδειξις, the stricter proof of logic or science. Thus πίστις 
is for him πειθοῦς κέλευθος, the method proper to a procedure which, 
like the plea of the rhetor, has for its object the establishment of the 
εἰκός. In much the same way the σήματα of Parmenides, fr. οὐ δ 
are the σημεῖα of forensic argumentation, which Aristotle in like 
manner and for the same reason distinguished from the more certain 








HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 719 


τεκμήρια. Thus we see that the dialectic of Parmenides, which 
eventuated in the Aristotelian logic, employed the forms and termi- 
nology of forensic rhetoric, though with an evident effort to reduce 
argumentation to the exactitude of demonstration; and πίστις ἀληθής is 
just this demonstration of truth. When, therefore, Parmenides objects 
to the βροτῶν δόξαι, it is because they do not carry the force of logical 
or dialectic evidence, or that such evidence is against them. 


V? 115,19. Fr. 
μόνος δ᾽ ἔτι θυμὸς ὁδοῖο 
λείπεται. 


V? 118, 38. Fr. 8, 1, 
μοῦνος δ᾽ ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο 
λείπεται, ὡς ἔστιν. 


It appears to be generally conceded that θυμός and μῦθος are cor- 
ruptions of one and the same word; θυμός, at any rate, is unintelligible. 
Of the numerous emendations proposed Platt’s ofuos is doubtless the 
best, though Diels seems to prefer ῥυμός; but ῥυμός does not so well 
explain the corruption as οἶμος. I am about to propose a correction, 
which seems to me all but certain. The stress on μόνος and λείπεται 
suggests that we are reduced to a way that barely remains. Similarly 
Plato, Symp. 184 B, μία δὲ λείπεται τῷ ἡμετέρῳ νόμῳ ὁδός, reinforced by 
184 E, μοναχοῦ ἐνταῦθα... . ἄλλοθι δὲ οὐδαμοῦ, like the Aristotelian 
dictum, τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς ἔστι, τὸ κατορθοῦν μοναχῶς, calls to 
mind the Gospel saying, στενὴ ἡ πύλη καὶ τεθλιμμένη ἡ ὁδὸς ἡ ἀπάγουσα 
εἰς τὴν ζωήν. I take it for granted that Parmenides regarded and 
characterized the way of Truth as a strait and narrow path, just as, 
ir. 6, 2 sq., he obviously thinks of the way of Error as broad, since 
“mortals, knowing nought, stagger (πλάττονται) along it with un- 
steady minds.” I can think of nothing so suitable for his purpose, 
or so likely to give rise to the corruptions θυμός and μῦθος, as the 
word ‘icuds. Plato, Tim. 69 15, uses it of the human neck, Emped. 
fr. 100, 19, of the narrow orifice of the clepsydra, and Hom., σ 300, 
uses ἔσθμιον of anecklace. The Homeric scholiast says that the throat 
is called ἰσθμός, ἀπὸ τοῦ εἰσιέναι τὴν τροφὴν bv’ abrod. The correspond- 
ing use of αὐχήν (Herod. 7. 223) and of fauces in Latin in speaking 
of a narrow defile or ‘isthmus’ is sufficiently well known. Now it 
happens that in Emped. fr. 100, 19, ἰσθμός has become corrupted in 
a part of the MS. tradition, and in Sophocl., fr. 145, 











PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


e \ a“ 
a δὲ μνᾶστις 
θνατοῖς εὐποτμότατα μελέων 
b] “ ali ἃ b , 
ἀνέχουσα βίου βραχὺν ἰσθμόν, 


where ἐσθμός refers to “the narrow span of life,’ modern scholars 
have ignorantly sought to substitute something else. Nauck here 
proposed οἶμον, as Platt does for Parmenides. But the MS. reading 
is confirmed by Aelian, V. H. 2. 41, ὅτε αὐτῷ τὸ ἐκ Βουτοῦς μαντεῖον 
ἀφίκετο προλέγον τὴν τοῦ βίου στενοχωρίαν, and by Cicero’s use of 
angustiae temporis. 

I should therefore read ἰσθμὸς ὁδοῖο in both fragments. Lest 
anyone be disturbed by the hiatus between ἔτι and ἰσθμός, | remark 
that we find another instance of it in fr. 4, 6, 


τὴν δή Tor φράζω παναπευθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπόν, 

in each case in the bucolic diaeresis. Diels, Parmenides Lehrgedicht, 
p. 67, in his note on the latter passage, well says: “ Der Hiat in der 
bukolischen Diirese nicht anzutasten!’’ Indeed, the collision of 
words ending and beginning with the same vowel was even regarded 
by ancient grammarians as peculiarly justifiable. See Christ, Metrik 
der Griechen and Romer*, Ὁ. 41, ὃ δῦ, and the remarks of ancient 
grammarians on Hom. Od. ἃ 595, Verg. Georg. 1, 281, and Hor. C. 
1. 28, 24. Herwerden, Lezxicon Gr. Suppletorium, p. 400, suggests 
that ἐσθμός may have had the digamma, referring to Pindar, Isth. 
1. 10, 32 and Bacchyl. 2, 7 Blass., but continues, “Sed fortasse hiatus 
nominum propriorum licentiae tribuendus. Cf. O. Schroeder, Prol. 
Pind. 11. p. 14 et p. 17. Nee sane digamma habere potuit, si des- 
scendit a verbo ἰέναι. Ido not believe it had the digamma. 


© Ὺ - ᾿ ‘ ᾿ 4 aa) ᾽ ; > 
ν᾽ 117, 7. ~Fr. 5, τὸ yap αὐτὸ νοεῖν ἐστίν τε καὶ εἶναι. 


The construction of this sentence has occasioned difficulties. It is 
obvious, however, that it is identical in meaning with fr. 8, 34, to be 
discussed below. I think we have here a case of brachylogy, and that 
we must supply νοεῖν before εἶναι from the preceding νοεῖν. ἡ “ For 
it 15 one and the same thing to think and to think that it 15. See 
the examples cited by Kiihner-Gerth, II. p. 565, § 597, ἢ. Burnet, 
Early Greek Philosophy”, p. 198, notes 1 and 3, propounds syntactical 
doctrines and puzzles which one ought in kindness to ignore. Any 
good grammar will supply abundant examples of the substantive 
use of the infinitive, with or without the article, earlier than the date 
of Parmenides. For Greek lyric poets, see Smyth, Greel Melie Poets, 








HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 721 


note on Aleman, fr. XII. For the articular infinitive in general, 
consult the articles of Professor Gildersleeve in Amer. Journ. of 


Philol. 
Vv? 117, 14. Fr. 6, 1, 


χρὴ TO λέγειν TE νοεῖν τ᾿ ἐὸν ἔμμεναι " ἔστι γὰρ εἶναι, 
μηδὲν δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν. 


The view of Diels and Burnet, which takes ἔστι and ἔστιν as 
equivalent to ἔξεστι, appears to me to be unsatisfactory; for the 
sentence thus becomes weak and out of character. Parmenides says: 
“For existence exists, and nought is not.” The absence of the article 
with εἶναι and μηδέν makes no difference. In regard to the first sen- 
tence, we must, perhaps, acquiesce in the view of Diels, who regards 
τό as the epic pronoun, and renders: “ Dies ist nétig zu sagen und 
zu denken, das nur das Seiende existiert’’; but this use of τό would be 
unique in Parmenides, in whom we expect the articular infinitive. 
It is possible that he meant “Speech and thought must be real’; for, 
though we do not otherwise find the recognition of the corporeal 
existence of thought and speech clearly expressed before the Stoics 
and Epicureans, it is by no means certain that Parmenides would not 
be called upon to defend his ‘materialistic’ doctrines by asserting the 
corporeality of thought and speech, since he expressly concerned 
himself with predication, fr. 8, 35 sq. 


V4 117, 21. Fr. 6, 8, 
ois TO πέλειν TE Kal οὐκ εἶναι ταὐτὸν νενόμισται 
κοὺ ταὐτόν. 


Burnet, Karly Greek Philosophy”, p. 198, n. 3, tortures this passage 
in order to eliminate the articular infinitives and the solecism τὸ... 
οὐκ εἶναι; but his interpretation is impossible, and, as we have seen, 
his reluctance to admit the articular infinitive is indefensible. As 
to τὸ... οὐκ εἶναι, others before him have found in it a rock of offence; 
but the responsibility rests with Parmenides. If he could say, οὕτως 
ἢ πάμπαν πελέναι χρεών ἐστι ἢ οὐχί (fr. 8, 11) alongside ἡ δ᾽ ὡς οὐκ 
ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι (fr. 4, 5) it is difficult to see why 
he should not have said τὸ οὐκ εἶναι instead of τὸ μὴ εἶναι. 


V? 119, 6. Fr. 8, 9, 
τί δ᾽ ἄν μιν Kal χρέος ὦρσεν 
ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν, τοῦ μηδενὸς ἀρξάμενον, φῦν. 








Ἐπ ea ἢ 


πε στα 


---------.-.---.-. -. οποίος. .(ὁ΄ὸ 


PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


Diels renders ὕστερον ἢ πρόσθεν with “friiher oder spiiter’’; Burnet, 
correctly I believe, with “later rather than sooner”; for I regard the 
phrase as a sort of comparatio compendiaria. The question was 
repeated and amplified by later philosophers; ep. Lucret. 5, 165-180; 
Cic. N. D. 1. 9. 21; V? 305, 16 sq.; Diels, Dox. Gr., p. 301, 2, καὶ οὔγε 
κατὰ TO πρῶτον μακάριός ἐστιν ὁ θεός, TO γὰρ ἐλλεῖπον εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν οὐ 
μακάριον, οὔτε κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον" μηδὲν γὰρ ἐλλείπων κεναῖς ἔμελλεν 
ἐπιχειρεῖν πράξεσιν. In the last passage I think we should clearly 
read kawats for κεναῖς; ep. Lucret. 5, 168 sq., 


Quidve novi potuit tanto post ante quietos 

inlicere ut cuperent vitam mutare priorem? 

nam gaudere novis rebus debere videtur 

cul veteres obsunt; sed cui nil accidit aegri 
tempore in anteacto, cum pulchre degeret aevum, 
quid potuit novitatis amorem accendere tali? 


οὕνεκεν οὐκ ἀτελεύτητον τὸ ἐὸν θέμις εἶναι" 


ἔστι γὰρ οὐκ ἐπιδευές, ἐὸν ὃ 


΄ὰ 


ἂν παντὸς ἐδεῖτο, 


is expanded by Plato, Tim. 32 C-34 A, with an obvious addition 33 A, 
which is apparently drawn from the Atomists. Cp. V?2343, 4 sq., and 
my <Antecedents of Greek: Corpuscular Theories, Harvard Studies in 
Class. Philol., 22 (1910), p. 139. See also the discussion above 
(p. 693 sq.) of V? 34, 18. 


V7 120, 13. ΕἸ. 8, 34, ταὐτὸν δ᾽ ἐστὶ νοεῖν τε καὶ obvexév ἐστι νόημα. 


So far as I am aware, all interpreters of Parmenides have taken 
οὕνεκεν in the sense of “that for the sake of which.’ This is, of 
course, quite possible; but we thus obtain no satisfactory sense unless 
we are to adopt the Neo-Platonic conceptions which obviously sug- 
gested the accepted rendering. Probably no student of ancient 
philosophy who has learned the rudiments of historical interpretation 
would go so far afield. Only the natural obsession that we must take 
our cue from the ancients, whose incapacity in this regard should no 
longer be a secret, can account for the failure of some one to make the 
obvious suggestion that we take οὕνεκεν as ὅτι, and read ἔστι; for it 
seems clear that Parmenides meant, “ Thinking and the thought that 
the object of thought exists, are one and the same.” Kiihner-Gerth, IT. 
p. 356, and the lexicons give the examples for this use of οὕνεκα; for 





HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 723 


the dependence of a substantive clause on a verbal substantive, 
Stahl, Arit.-histor. Syntax des gr. Verbums der klass. Zeit, p. 546, § 2, 
gives abundant examples, to which a careful reader will be able to 
add largely in a week. The parallelism of infinitive and substantive 
is no closer than Mimnermus, 2, 10, 


αὐτίκα τεθνάμεναι βέλτιον ἢ βίοτος. 


If the inverted order of words should cause any one to hesitate, let 
him recall Xenophanes, fr. 34, 2, 


Kal ἅσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων, 


and Sophocl. O. R. 500 sq., quoted above, p. 718, on fr. 1, 28 sq. 
I regard this construction as of especial importance, because the 
frank equivalence of the infinitive with the substantive would seem 
to render for all time impossible the strange acrobatic feats performed 
by Burnet in his endeavor to eliminate the substantival infinitive, 
with or without the article, from the text of Parmenides. 


c.19. Geno. 


ν᾽ 133, 8. Fr. 1, καὶ περὶ rod προὔχοντος ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος. καὶ yap 
ἐκεῖνο ἕξει μέγεθος καὶ προέξει αὐτοῦ τι. ὅμοιον δὴ τοῦτο ἅπαξ τε 
εἰπεῖν καὶ ἀεὶ λέγειν. οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοιοῦτον ἔσχατον ἔσται οὔτε 
ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον οὐκ ἔσται. οὕτως εἰ πολλά ἐστιν, ἀνάγκη αὐτὰ 
μικρά τε εἶναι καὶ μεγάλα" μικρὰ μὲν ὥστε μὴ ἔχειν μέγεθος, μεγάλα 
δὲ ὥστε ἄπειρα εἶναι. 


The question discussed in the portion of the fragment here repro- 
duced concerns the second alternative, μεγάλα δὲ ὥστε ἄπειρα εἶναι. 
There is some difference of opinion among scholars regarding the 
precise conception of τὸ προὔχον. For some years I have been accus- 
tomed to think of the προὔχον ἔσχατον of Zeno as the extremum quodque 
cacumen of Lucretius 1, 599; or, more exactly, I have held and still 
hold that the Epicurean doctrine of the partes minimae, of which the 
definition of the eatremum cacumen is a part, owed its origin in part 
to this argument of Zeno’s. ‘The discussion of the partes minimae by 
Giussani had never satisfied me; the view of Pascal, Studii Critici 
sul Poema di Lucrezio (1903), p. 49 sq., seemed to me essentially 
sound (see Amer. Journ. of Philol., 24, p. 332). He drew attention 
to Aristotle’s arguments (De Anim. 409* 13 sq., De Gen. et Corr. 
326° 1 sq., Phys. 240” 8 sq.) to prove that the ἀμερές cannot have 








24 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


motion, or at most can have motion κατὰ συμβεβηκός only, which 
would be fatal to the older Atomism. Pascal himself did not see that 
Aristotle (and MXG. 977” 11 sq.) derived his arguments from Plato, 
Parm. 138 BC. With these we must clearly associate the questions 
touching the rotation of a circle or a sphere, Arist. Phys. 240* 29 sq., 
265 7; Simpl. Phys. 1022; [Arist.] Qu. Mech. ο. 1; Plotin. Ennead. 
2.2.1. But Plato clearly had in mind positions taken by the younger 
Eleatics, which he was developing. What these were in detail I am 
unable to say; but the argument of Zeno which we are considering 
seems to me to present the same problem from another angle; if the 
criticisms of Plato and Aristotle, applied to the atom, as an ἀμερές, 
rendered motion, which the Atomists regarded as inherent in it, 
apparently impossible, the criticism of Zeno made it necessary that 
there should be a limit to the number and the divisibility of the parts 
of which a revised atomism might concede that it was composed. 
In fr. 1, therefore, I regard αὐτοῦ in προέξει αὐτοῦ τι as a partitive 
genitive, and accept the emendation of Gomperz, ὥστε ἕτερον πρὸ ἑτέρου 
for οὔτε ἕτερον πρὸς ἕτερον. As I conceive the matter, Zeno does not 
think of a cacumen as being added; but, since every extended part is 
susceptible of division, that which we regard as the προὔχον must 
always have an outer and an inner half, and so by the division ad 
infinitum of the προὔχον itself there is crowded between it and the 
next inward ‘unit’ an infinitude of parts which, from Zeno’s point of 
view, must in effect advance the προὔχον or cacumen outward ad 
infinitum. Consequently things become μεγάλα ὥστε ἄπειρα εἶναι. 


c. 20. Melissus. 


Ν 145,10. Fr. 7. 3, ἀλλ᾽ οὐδὲ μετακοσμηθῆναι ἀνυστόν " ὁ γὰρ κό- 
σμος ὁ πρόσθεν ἐὼν οὐκ ἀπόλλυται οὔτε ὁ μὴ ἐὼν γίνεται. ὅτε δὲ μήτε 
προσγίνεται μηδὲν μήτε ἀπόλλυται μήτε ἑτεροιοῦται, πῶς ἂν μετα- 
κοσμηθὲν τῶν ἐόντων εἴη; εἰ μὲν γάρ τι ἔγίνετο ἑτεροῖον, ἤδη ἂν 


καὶ μετατκοσμηθείη. 


A careful reading of this passage will convince any scholar that there 
is something wrong with it. The difficulty, however, lies entirely in 
the clause πῶς... εἴη, where the MSS. read μετακοσμηθέντων ἐόντων 
zt}. Mullach and Ritter-Preller present the same text as Diels, 
except that they read τὶ εἴη. Diels renders the clause thus: “wie 
sollte es nach der Umgestaltung noch zu dem Seienden ziihlen?”’ 
Burnet, apparently accepting the text of Mullach and Ritter-Preller, 





HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. (20 


translates “how can any real thing have had its order changed?” 
I do not believe this rendering, which agrees with that of Mullach, is 
possible, for I know of no such periphrastic form as μετακοσμηθὲν εἴη 
(ἀπαρνηθείς, Plato, Soph. 217 C, is aor. pass. in form only); that of 
Diels, on the other hand, though clearly necessary if one adopts his 
text, does not yield the thought required in the context. I incline to 
think that τὶ and ἢ are marginal corrections which have been misread 
and misplaced, and that we should read πῶς ἂν μετακοσμηθείη τι τῶν 
ἐόντων; “How should anything real suffer change of order?” 


> | ‘ oy ” on \ rat > t δον “ ᾽ ᾿ 
Ν᾿ 149,1. Fr. 9, εἰ μὲν οὖν εἴη, δεῖ αὐτὸ ἕν εἶναι" ἕν δὲ ὃν αὐτὸ 
σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν. εἰ δὲ ἔχοι πάχος, ἔχοι ἂν μόρια, καὶ οὐκέτι ἕν εἴη. 


Although Simplicius twice so quotes Melissus, and we cannot 
therefore doubt that his text so read, I cannot believe that Melissus 
wrote σῶμα μὴ ἔχειν. That the Neo-Platonists understood him as 
holding that the existent is incorporeal is of course well known, but 
is insufficient warrant for attributing the doctrine to him. Zeller 
and Burnet seek to obviate the difficulty by referring the fragment, 
not to the Eleatic One, but to the Pythagorean Unit. Against this 
view there are two objections which appear to me to be fatal to it: 
first, we should have to suppose that Simplicius, who read this passage 
in its context, did not grasp its import, which must have been fairly 
clear; second, even if Simplicius should have erred in this respect, 
the argument of Melissus must have been applicable to the Eleatic 
One, and so Simplicius would be substantially right in quoting the 
words in order to prove that the Eleatic One was incorporeal. ‘This 
very conception of Eleatic doctrine, however, would sufficiently 
account for a corruption of the text, such as reading ἔχειν for εἶναι. 
That is what I conceive to have occurred. Melissus, tunderstanding 
σῶμα as an ἄθροισμα of parts which, because divisible ad infinitum, 
must be tridimensional or “have thickness,” says that a true Unit 
(whether Eleatic or Pythagorean) cannot be conceived as a σῶμα or 
ἄθροισμα. See Amer. Journ. of Philol., Vol. 28, p. 79. At the begin- 
ning of the same clause the MS. tradition clearly points to the read- 
ing ἕν δ᾽ ἐὸν rather than ἕν δὲ ὃν. This correction, which I had noted 
several years ago, has now been made by Diels in V’. 


c. 21. Empedocles. 


V? 203, 13sq. Arist. De Anima 1. 2. 404° § sq., asserts that Em- 
pedocles regarded the soul (ψυχή) as compounded of all the elements, 





120 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


and quotes fr. 109 to prove it. So far as I can recall, all scholars 
have been content to accept this deduction of Aristotle, although 
the words quoted offer not the slightest confirmation of it and the 
doctrine thus ascribed to Empedocles is diametrically opposed to his 
conception of ψυχή in matters of religion. This conflict has been 
often noted, but no one seems to have seen that the solution of the 
difficulty lies in the simple fact that Empedocles did not connect 
these functions with the ψυχή, which he, like many other early 
Greeks, thought of as the entity only which escapes from man at the 
moment of death and survives the body. Fr. 110, 10, 


πάντα yap ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν Kal νώματος αἶσαν, 


shows what language Empedocles used: everything has φρόνησις and 
νόημα, but not ψυχή. See my remarks in Amer. Journ. of Philol., 
33, p. 94 sq., and Journ. of Philos., Psychol. and Scient. Methods, 
10, p. 107. 


ν᾿ 203, 34. Fr. 110, 


εἰ yap κέν σφ᾽ ἀδινῇσιν ὑπὸ πραπίδεσσιν ἐρείσας 


εὐμενέως καθαρῇσιν ἐποπτεύσῃς μελέτῃσιν, 
ταῦτά τέ σοι μάλα πάντα δι᾽ αἰῶνος παρέσονται, 
ἄλλα τε πόλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶνδ᾽ ἐκτήσεαι " αὐτὰ γὰρ αὔξει 
ταῦτ᾽ εἰς ἦθος ἕκαστον, ὅπῃ φύσις ἐστὶν ἑκάστῳ. 
εἰ δὲ σὺ γ᾽ ἀλλοίων ἐπορέξεαι, οἷα κατ᾽ ἄνδρας 
μυρία δειλὰ πέλονται ἅ τ᾽ ἀμβλύνουσι μερίμνας, 
ἢ σ᾽ ἄφαρ ἐκλείψουσι περιπλομένοιο χρόνοιο 
σφῶν αὐτῶν ποθέοντα φίλην ἐπὶ γένναν ἱκέσθαι" 
10 πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νώματος αἶσαν. 


The text of this fragment as given by Hippolytus is extremely 
corrupt; but I accept the text given by Diels everywhere except in 
verses 4 and 5. Here the MSS. read αὔξει and ἔθος: Diels retains the 
former and adopts Miller’s suggestion of ἦθος for the latter. This 
text I think is clearly wrong, as the difficulties experienced by Diels 
in rendering the passage ought to convince any reader. But v. 8 sq. 
seem to me to show what we require; for they obviously contain the 
converse of the statement which the poet made in the sentence we 
are considering. I am convinced that Empedocles wrote ἄξει, not 
αὔξει; with regard to ἔθος, one may hesitate before deciding between the 
claims of ἔθνος and ἦθος. In favor of ἔθνος one may quote Hippocr. 
Περὶ τόπων τῶν κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, 1 (6, 278 L.), τοῦτο δ᾽ ὁποῖον ἄν τι πάθῃ, 


HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS 


τὸ σμικρότατον ἐπαναφέρει πρὸς THY ὁμοεθνίην ἕκαστον πρὸς τὴν ἑωυτοῦ, ἤν 
τε κακὸν ἤν τε ἀγαθὸν ἢ " καὶ διὰ ταῦτα καὶ ἀλγέει καὶ ἥδεται ὑπὸ ἔθνεος τοῦ 
σμικροτάτου τὸ σῶμα, ὅτι ἐν τῷ σμικροτάτῳ πάντ᾽ ἔνι τὰ μέρεα, καὶ ταῦτα 
ἐπαναφέρουσιν ἐς τὰ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἕκαστα, καὶ ἐξαγγέλλουσι πάντα. Other 
passages which may be compared are the following. Hippocr. Περὶ 
φύσιος ἀνθρώπου, 3 (6, 388 L.), καὶ πάλιν γε ἀνάγκη ἀποχωρέειν ἐς τὴν 
ἑωυτοῦ φύσιν ἕκαστον, τελευτῶντος τοῦ σώματος τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τό τε ὑγρὸν 
πρὸς τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν πρὸς τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ θερμὸν πρὸς τὸ θερμὸν καὶ 
τὸ ψυχρὸν πρὸς τὸ ψυχρόν. τοιαύτη δὲ καὶ τῶν ζῴων ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις καὶ τῶν 
ἄλλων πάντων" γίνεταί τε ὁμοίως πάντα καὶ τελευτᾷ ὁμοίως πάντα" ξυνί- 
σταταί τε γὰρ αὐτέων ἡ φύσις ἀπὸ τουτέων τῶν προειρημένων πάντων, καὶ 
τελευτᾷ κατὰ τὰ εἰρημένα ἐς τωὐτὸ ὅθεν περ ξυνέστη ἕκαστον, ἐνταῦθα οὖν 
καὶ ἀπεχώρησεν. Ilepi φύσιος Ταιδίου 17 (7, 496 L.), ἡ δὲ σὰρξ αὐξο- 
μένη ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος ἀρθροῦται, καὶ ἔρχεται ἐν αὐτέῃ ἕκαστον τὸ ὅμοιον 
ὡς τὸ ὅμοιον, τὸ πυκνὸν ὡς τὸ πυκνόν, τὸ ἀραιὸν ὡς τὸ ἀραιόν, τὸ ὑγρὸν ὡς 
τὸ ὑγρόν " καὶ ἕκαστον ἔρχεται ἐς χώρην ἰδίην κατὰ τὸ ξυγγενές, ad’ οὗ 
καὶ ἔγένετο. Plato, Tim. 63 E, ἡ πρὸς τὸ συγγενὲς 666s. Ibid. 90 A, 
πρὸς τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ συγγένειαν. Herod. 4. 147, ἀποπλεύσεσθαι ἐς τοὺς 
συγγενέας. Plotin. Ennead. 4. 3. 24, εἰς τὸν προσήκοντα αὐτῷ τόπον. 
Hermias, Irris. 7 (219, 14), εἰς δὲ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν ἐπανιὼν ἀήρ. Me- 
nand. Epitrep. 105, 


εἰς δὲ τὴν αὑτοῦ φύσιν 
ἄρας ἐλείθερόν τι τολμήσει ποεῖν. 


Lucret. 2, 1112, 


nam sua cuique locis ex omnibus omnia plagis 
corpora distribuuntur et ad sua saecla recedunt. 


These examples sufficiently prove that one can draw no inference from 
εἰς Which would serve to decide the respective claims of ἦθος and ἔθνος: 
besides, the epic use of eis with reference to persons as well as places 
(Il. 7, 312; 15, 402; Od. 14, 126 sq.), which would obtain in Empedo- 
cles, leaves the question open. The poet means to say that Pausanias, 
to whom he addresses his poem as Lucretius addressed his to Mem- 
mius, if he gives heed to the instruction of his master, will find that it 
will lead him into all truth, since each truth will seek its fellows, each 
after its own kind; but if he deserts the living truth, it will in turn 
desert him, each truth, as before, longing to join its kindred. There 
are two passages in which Lucretius has plainly derived inspiration 
and suggestion from these words of Empedocles. 








PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


Multaque praeterea tibi possum commemorando 
argumenta fidem dictis corradere nostris. 
verum animo satis haee vestigia parva sagaci 
sunt per quae possis cognoscere cetera tute. 
namque canes ut montivagae persaepe ferarum 
naribus inveniunt intectas fronde quietes, 

cum semel institerunt vestigia certa vial, 

sic alid ex alio per te tute ipse videre 

talibus in rebus poteris caecasque latebras 
insinuare omnis et verum protrahere inde. 


Haec sei pernosces parva perductus opella 


namque alid ex alio clarescet nec tibi caeca 


nox iter eripiet quin ultima natural 
pervideas: ita res accendent lumina rebus. 


After 1, 1114, with Munro, I assume a lacuna; for it appears obvious 
that the sentence is incomplete. But in the absence of more certain 
indications I refrain from speculating as to what and how much may 
have perished in the breach. Yet perductus, which is clearly right 
and ought not to be changed to perdoctus, and iter, like the words of 
Empedocles, suggest guidance on the way of truth: it is possible that 
Lucretius may have taken a hint, as 2, 75 sq., from ancient relay 
torch races, in which one runner handed over his torch or ignited that 
of his team-mate, to illustrate the way in which a truth once known 
flashes light far along paths hitherto shrouded in night. In 1, 400 sq. 
Lucretius cleverly adapts a conception to his own uses. As he did 
not accept the doctrine of the ubiquity of intelligence in nature, 
which underlies the thought of Empedocles, he was obliged to intro- 
duce a simile in lieu of the bold personification ὁΐ facts and truths 
which renders memorable the passage of his predecessor. We natur- 
ally ask whether there was anything in his model to suggest the 
particular simile which he chose. Now, it must be confessed that 
there is a possible point of contact, if Empedocles wrote ἦθος rather 
than ἔθνος; for in that case ἦθος would certainly not mean “charac- 
ter” or “heart,’’ as has been supposed, but “haunts” or “lair,” 
according to a usage familiar in Greek. In that event we should 
have to think of facts or truths as having, like mountain-ranging 
beasts, their lairs where they hide their young and to which they 
themselves return and guide the man who follows them. If Empedo- 
cles used the word ἦθος, one might see in v. 4, ἄλλα τε πόλλ᾽ ἀπὸ τῶνδ᾽ 


HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 729 


ἐκτήσεαι, a reference to τόκος, usury; for, as one may perceive by 
Aeschin. 8. 35, δανείσματα οὐκ ὀλίγα, ad’ ὧν ἐκεῖνος τόκους ἐλάμβανε, the 
phraseology suggests it. Ancient writers, however, were fully aware 
of the metaphor, which was still alive, and played on the word, 
as Ar. Thesmoph. 842 sq., Plato, Repub. 555 E, Arist. Pol. 1. 10. 1258? 
5 sq.. This metaphor would well lead up to that of ἦθος, as the lair 
of wild beasts. From this too, it would be easy to explain the figure 
of Lucretius, who substitutes mountain-ranging hounds tracking the 
beasts to their lairs (quietes, 1, 405, and caccas latebras, 408). Indeed, 
it is possible that Empedocles may have used the simile of the hound 
in this very connection, fr. 101, 


κέρματα θηρείων μελέων μυκτῆρσιν ἐρευνῶν 
«ὀσμᾶθ᾽» ὅσσ᾽ ἀπέλειπε ποδῶν ἁπαλῇ περὶ ποίῃ. 


But the context in which the fragment is quoted by our ancient 
authorities, as well as Lucret. 4, 680 sq., suggest rather that Empedocles 
was there illustrating his doctrine of universal ἀπορροιαί. I find it 
difficult, therefore, to decide between the claims of ἔθνος and ἦθος; but 
incline on the whole to favor the former because of v. 9, 


, i? , \ , e ἐ 
ποθέοντα φίλην ἐπὶ γένναν ἱκέσθαι. 


I may add that Mr. Cornford, From Religion to Philosophy, p. 64 


makes an interesting suggestion in regard to Emped. fr. 17, 28, 


τιμῆς δ᾽ ἄλλης ἄλλο μέδει, παρὰ δ᾽ ἦθος ἑκάστῳ, 


where he renders παρὰ... ἑκάστῳ, ‘each has its wonted range.’ See 
ibid., p. 34. 

Now that the general sense of Emped. fr. 110 is clear, there can 
be no doubt about the meaning of v. 5, ὅπῃ φύσις ἐστὶν ἑκάστῳ. It is 
prout cuique natura est, “each after its kind.” 


c. 32. Philolaus. 
V? 239, 31. Fr. 1, a φύσις δ᾽ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ. 


In V3 Diels adopts certain suggestions made in my Notes on Philo- 
laus, Amer. Journ. of Philol., 28, p. 79, to which he refers, but rightly 
retains δ᾽ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ instead of δὲ τῶ κόσμω, which I formerly pro- 
posed; but in sense τῶ κόσμω was more nearly right than his rendering 
“bei der Weltordnung.” In the notes he now cites parallels, which 
I furnished, for φύσις ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ. They sufficiently explain the 











»"ῶ 
(30 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


phrase and fix its meaning. I will now add another, Plotin. Ennead. 
3. 8. 1, παίζοντες δὴ τὴν πρώτην πρὶν ἐπιχειρεῖν σπουδάζειν εἰ λέγοιμεν 
πάντα θεωρίας ἐφίεσθαι καὶ εἰς τέλος τοῦτο βλέπειν, οὐ μόνον ἔλλογα ἀλλὰ 
καὶ ἄλλογα ζῷα καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς φύσιν καὶ τὴν ταῦτα γεν- 
νῶσαν γῆν κτλ. Thus ἡ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ φύσις = ἡ τοῦ κόσμου φύσις. In 
Plotinus there is probably a suggestion of the common, universal 
φύσις as manifesting itself in plant-life; but all these passages alike 
prove that the phrase does not mean “bei der Weltordnung.”’ 


2 Ἢ ¢ - “ΟΝ ᾿ \ . nan ” 
V* 240, 5. Fr. 2, δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ Ev τοῖς ἔργοις. 


Since Diels has now (V%) adopted my interpretation of these words, 
I might allow the matter to rest there; but the observation that this 
and similar phrases have been unduly pressed in other contexts leads 
me to illustrate it further. Nestle, in Philol., 67, 544, writing as it 
seems in ignorance both of Newbold’s article and of mine, arrived at 
substantially the same conclusion with myself. It would carry us 
too far afield to consider in detail the passages which I have studied: 
hence I will give a list of those only which serve to illustrate Greek 
usage. It will be seen that ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις and ἐπὶ τῶν ἔργων are gen- 
erally used when appeal is made to facts of common observation or 
knowledge, as opposed to theory, argument, or unsupported statement. 
As a matter of fact, these references are usually so general that they 
amount to nothing but the bald assertion that observation or knowl- 
edge confirms or contradicts the proposition in question. In very 
few cases which I have noted does the context suffice to enable one 
to specify the particular facts to which the writer affects to appeal: 
many passages are open to different interpretations and competent 
scholars find it difficult to agree about them. They are therefore 
especially valuable for our purposes. See Plato, Protag. 352 A, Soph. 
254 E, Gorg. 461 D, Repub. 396 A, 599 B, Phaedo 110 A, Tim. 19 E, 
Legg. 679 D, Axiochus 369 A; Xenoph. Hiero 9.3; Bonitz, Index Arist. 
286° 27 sq., 40 sq.; Bywater, on Arist. Poet. 1453°17. Cp. Arist. De 
Gen. Animal. 3. 11. 762° 15, οὐθὲν yap ἐκ παντὸς γίνεται, καθάπερ οὐδ᾽ ἐν 
τοῖς ὑπὸ τῆς τέχνης δημιουργουμένοις. Meteor. 4. 3. 381° 10, καὶ οὐδὲν 
διαφέρει ἐν ὀργάνοις τεχνικοῖς ἢ φυσικοῖς, ἐὰν γίγνηται" διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν γὰρ 
αἰτίαν πάντα ἔσται. Such general references to the similarity of prod- 
ucts of art and of nature abound in certain works of the Corpus 
Hippocrateum. See also Hippocr. Περὶ φυσέων, 5 (where, after stating 
his theory, the writer says), περὶ μὲν οὖν ὅλου τοῦ πρήγματος ἀρκεῖ μοι 
ταῦτα " μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα πρὸς αὐτὰ τὰ ἔργα τῷ αὐτῷ λόγῳ πορευθεὶς ἐπιδείξω 


HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 


τὰ νοσήματα τούτου ἔκγονα πάντα ἐόντα. In this instance the particular 
“facts”? to which he appeals are mentioned. It is interesting to hear 
his conclusion, c. 15, ὑπεσχόμην δὲ τῶν νούσων τὸ αἴτιον φράσειν " ἐπέ- 
δειξα δὲ τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὅλοις πρήγμασι δυναστεῦον καὶ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι 
τῶν ζῴων " ἤγαγον δὲ τὸν λόγον ἐπὶ τὰ γνώριμα τῶν ἀρρωστημάτων, ἐν οἷς 
ἀληθὴς ἡ ὑπόσχεσις (ν. 1. ὑπόθεσις) ἐφάνη " εἰ γὰρ περὶ πάντων τῶν ἀρρω- 
στημάτων λέγοιμι, μακρότερος μὲν ὁ λόγος ἂν γένοιτο, ἀτρεκέστερος δὲ 


οὐδαμῶς οὐδὲ πιστότερος. 


V? 241,12. Fr. 6, ἰσοταγῆ. 


Diels has now adopted my emendation ἰσοταγῆ for MS. ἰσοταχῆ. 
When I proposed it, I ventured the suggestion relying on the analogy 
of ὁμοταγής, not knowing that ἰσοταγής itself was attested. [I now 
observe, however, that Sophocles, Greek Lexicon, s. v. cites it from 


Nicom. 51. 
c. 46. Anaxagoras. 


V? 319,19. Fr. 13, καὶ ἐπεὶ ἤρξατο ὁ νοῦς κινεῖν, ἀπὸ τοῦ κινουμένου 
παντὸς ἀπεκρίνετο, καὶ ὅσον ἐκίνησεν ὁ νοῦς, πᾶν τοῦτο διεκρίθη " 
κινουμένων δὲ καὶ διακρινομένων ἡ περιχώρησις πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἐποίει 


διακρίνεσθαι. 


It seems to me clear that ὁ νοῦς is the subject of ἀπεκρίνετο in the 
second clause. “After the νοῦς gave the initial impulse to the 
motion of the world, it began to withdraw from all that was set in 
motion; and all that to which the movement initiated by the vois 
extended, was segregated. As this motion and segregation con- 
tinued, the revolution greatly increased the segregation.” The νοῦς 
gives the first impulse only, then withdraws to its condition of isola- 
tion; the revolution, once started, of itself accelerates and its effects 
in the segregation of like to like in the πάντα ὁμοῦ increase. Cp. 
ἡ περιχώρησις αὐτή, fr. 12, V? 319, 4 sq. 


c. 51. Diogenes of Apollonia. 


V2 334, 2. Fr. 1, λόγου παντὸς ἀρχόμενον δοκεῖ μοι χρεὼν εἶναι τὴν 
ἀρχὴν ἀναμφισβήτητον παρέχεσθαι. 


With this statement compare Hippocr. Περὶ σαρκῶν, 1 (8. 584 L.), 
Ἐγὼ τὰ μέχρι τοῦ λόγου τούτου κοινῇσι Ὑνώμῃσι χρέομαι ἑτέρων TE τῶν 
ἔμπροσθεν, ἀτὰρ καὶ ἐμεωυτοῦ - ἀναγκαίως γὰρ ἔχει κοινὴν ἀρχὴν ὑποθέσθαι 








PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


τῇσι Ὑνώμῃσι βουλόμενον ξυνθεῖναι τὸν λόγον τόνδε περὶ τῆς τέχνης τῆς 
ἰητρικῆς. Llepi τέχνης, 4 (θ. 0 1,.)}, ἐστὲ μὲν οὖν μοι ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου, ἣ 
καὶ ὁμολογηθήσεται παρὰ πᾶσιν. ἹἸΠερὶ τόπων τῶν κατὰ ἄνθρωπον, 2 (6. 
278 L.), φύσις τοῦ σώματος, ἀρχὴ τοῦ ἐν ἰητρικῇ λόγου. Ion of Chios, 
fr. 1 (V? 222, 1 sq.), ἀρχὴ δέ μοι τοῦ λόγου" πάντα τρία καὶ οὐδὲν πλέον 
ἢ ἔλασσον τούτων τῶν τριῶν " ἑνὸς ἑκάστου ἀρετὴ Tpias’ σύνεσις καὶ 
κράτος καὶ τύὐχη. 


c. 54. Leucippus. 


V? 343, 1. τὸ μὲν πᾶν ἄ wo ἰρηται * δὲ τὸ 

. ke γὼ ἢ πειρὸν φησιν, ὡς προείρηται" τούτου δὲ τὸ 
μὲν πλῆρες εἶναι, τὸ δὲ κενόν, «ἃ» καὶ στοιχεῖά φησι, κόσμους τε ἐκ 
τούτων ἀπείρους εἶναι καὶ διαλύεσθαι εἰς ταῦτα. 


For some time I have felt that there was some confusion and 
corruption in the text, and that the last sentence must refer to the 
rise of the worlds out of the ἄπειρον and their return into it at dissolu- 
tion. The well-known difficulties of the text of Diogenes alone 
deterred me from proposing a change. Now Diels, apparently from 
the MSS., restores ἐκ τούτου for ἐκ τούτων. That is obviously the 
correct reading, whatever its source; but with it should of course go 
the complementary reading εἰς τοῦτο for εἰς ταῦτα. The preceding 
sentence, however, has likewise suffered. The ἄπειρον is clearly 
conceived as the Aristotelian ἀρχὴ καὶ στοιχεῖον by the interpolator 
or epitomator who supplied the clause <a> καὶ στοιχεῖά φησι; for to 
his mind the words τούτου τὸ μέν πλῆρες, τὸ δὲ κενόν do not suggest 
spatial regions of the extended ἄπειρον, but ontological γένη of the 
metaphysical ἀρχή. His addition was absurdly misplaced, as were 
many in the text of Diogenes; but once there, it corrupted the 
following sentence. See above, p. 691, on V? 17, 37. 


2 . Ὑ ‘ hes ἘΠ Ὁ" en δὰ ’ 
V* 344,14. Arist. De Gen. et Corr. 1. 8. 324” 35, ὁδῷ δὲ μάλιστα 
καὶ περὶ πάντων ἑνὶ λόγῳ διωρίκασι Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος. 


The meaning of the phrase ἑνὲ λόγῳ has here been strangely 
musconceived. Prantl renders it “in einer Begriindung”’; Zeller, 
1” 847, n. 1, “aus den gleichen Principien”; Déring, Gesch. der gr. 
Philos., 1. 238, “die von einem Princip ausgehende Lésung”’; Burnet, 
Karly Greek Philosophy, 385, “on the same theory.” I have failed 
to find this passage noted in Kranz’s Wortindex, but in a similar one 
(V? 83, 8, évl δὲ λόγῳ πάντα κτλ.), omitting to quote πάντα, he gives 
the meaning of λόγος as “ Vernunft” (V? II. 2, 357, 30)! Similarly 


HEIDEL.— ON FRAGMENTS OF THE PRE-SOCRATICS. 7303 


Burnet, in his note on Plato, Phaedo 65 D, gives a false emphasis 
and in effect a false interpretation, because he overlooks, what is 
obvious, that in the phrase καὶ τῶν ἄλλων evi λόγῳ ἁπάντων, the 
phrase ἑνὲ λόγῳ is to be taken as emphasizing ἁπάντων; and Capps, 
on Menander, Epitrep. 197 sq. 
καταμενῶ, 
αὔριον ὅτῳ βούλεσθ᾽ ἐπιτρέπειν ἑνὶ λόγῳ 
ἕτοιμος, 


wrongly takes ἑνὲ λόγῳ with ἕτοιμος instead of ὅτῳ βούλεσθ᾽. Curios- 
ity, awakened by the false points made by scholars in connection 
with the Aristotelian passage we are considering, led me to make 
a collection of cases of évi λόγῳ, which grew to considerable propor- 
tions. I will not print a list here, since such collections possess no 
value in my sight except as an examination of the context serves to 
determine the sense of the locution in question. Suffice it to say that 
in almost every instance the immediate context contained a compre- 
hensive or universal expression, such as πᾶν, οὐδέν, μυρία, etc. But 
ἑνὶ λόγῳ does not stand alone, for there is a considerable number of 
phrases similarly used; of these I give a few which should serve to 
illustrate the construction. Aeschyl. P. V. 46, ὡς ἁπλῷ λόγῳ 
οὐδὲν; ibid. 505, βραχεῖ δὲ μύθῳ πάντα συλλήβδην pale; ibid. 975, ἁπλῷ 
λόγῳ πάντας ἐχθαίρω θεούς; Herod. 2. 24, ὡς μέν νυν ἐν ἐλαχίστῳ dnhw- 
σαι, πᾶν εἴρηται; ibid. 225, ὡς δὲ ἐν πλέονι λόγῳ δηλῶσαι, ὧδε ἔχει; 
ibid. 2. 37, μυρίας ὡς εἰπεῖν λόγῳ; ibid. 3. 6, ἕν κεράμιον οἰνηρὸν ἀριθμῷ 
κεινὸν οὐκ ἔστι ὡς λόγῳ εἰπεῖν ἰδέσθαι; ibid. 3. 82, Evi δὲ ἔπει πάντα 
συλλαβόντα εἰπεῖν; Plato Apol. 22 B, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ὀλίγου αὐτῶν ἅπαν- 
τας; Xenoph. Mem. 4. 3. 7, ὡς γὰρ συνελόντι εἰπεῖν, οὐδέν κτλ.; Amphis, 
fr. 30, 7 Kock, ἅπαντες ἀνδροφόνοι γάρ εἰσιν ἑνὶ λόγῳ. Adverbs like 
ἔμβαχυ are similarly employed. After reciting this list of passages I 
think we may be sure that in the passage we are considering Aristotle 
merely meant to say that the procedure of Leucippus and Democritus 
was not only exceedingly methodical (ὁδῷ μάλιστα), but also com- 
prehensive (περὶ πάντων ἑνὶ λόγῳ). Possibly those who have been 
reading something more into Aristotle’s words might receive some 
comfort from Hippocr. Περὶ ἑπταμήνου, 3 (7. 438 L.), χρῶνται δὲ πᾶσαι 
ἑνὶ λόγῳ περὶ τουτέου: φασὶ yap κτλ. But the context shows that 
ἑνὶ λόγῳ means “one formula of expression.” Even if one should 
insist on taking Aristotle’s words as a parallel to this, it would greatly 
affect the traditional interpretations of the passage. 











por 


(o4 PROCEFDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY. 


V? 344, 21. Arist. De Gen. et Corr. 1. 8. 325% 25. ὁμολογήσας δὲ 
ταῦτα μὲν τοῖς φαινομένοις, τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἕν κατασκευάζουσιν ὡς οὐκ ἂν 
κίνησιν οὖσαν ἄνευ κενοῦ, τό τε κενὸν μὴ ὃν καὶ τοῦ ὄντος οἰθὲν μὴ ὄν 
φησιν εἶναι. τὸ γὰρ κυρίως ὃν παμπλῆρες ὄν. 


[ cannot understand how scholars have been so long content to 
retain this text, which yields no sense and so clearly suggests the true 
reading. With it we must compare other passages in which the same 
matter 15. under consideration. Arist. Met. 1. 4. 985> 4 (V? 343, 44), 
Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ ὁ ἑταῖρος αὐτοῦ Δημόκριτος στοιχεῖα μὲν τὸ πλῆρες καὶ 
τὸ κενὸν εἶναί φασι, λέγοντες τὸ μὲν ὃν τὸ δὲ μὴ ὄν, τούτων δὲ τὸ μὲν 
πλῆρες καὶ στερεὸν τὸ ὄν, € κενὸν καὶ μανὸν τὸ μὴ ὄν (διὰ καὶ 
οὐθὲν μᾶλλον τὸ ὄν ᾿ μὴ ὄντος εἶναί φασιν, ὅτε οὐδὲ TO 
κενὸν «ἔλαττον Diels> τοῦ 
ὡς ὕλην. Whether Diels was right in proposing to insert ἔλαττον we 
shall have presently to inquire. Simpl. Phys. 28, 11 (V2 345, 5), ἔτι 
δὲ οὐδὲν μᾶλλον τὸ ὃν ἢ τὸ μὴ ὃν ὑπάρχειν, καὶ αἴτια ὁμοίως 


σώματοΞ), αἴτια δὲ τῶν ὄντων ταῦτα 


Ω 


εἰναι τοῖς γινομένοις ἄμφω. τὴν μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἀτόμων οὐσίαν ναστὴν καὶ 
πλήρη ὑποθέμενος ὃν ἔλεγεν εἶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ κενῷ φέρεσθαι, ὅπερ μὴ ὃν 
ἐκάλει καὶ οὐκ ἔλαττον τοῦ ὄντος εἶναί φησι. We are familiar 
with the pun which Democritus employed to enforce this point of 
doctrine, fr. 156 (V2 413, 11), μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δὲν ἢ τὸ μηδὲν εἶναι. 
It seems to me obvious that in the passage under consideration μὴ ὄν 
is a corruption by itacism for μεῖόν. Indeed, I am inclined to think 
that the pun τό τε κενὸν μὴ ὃν Kal τοῦ ὄντος οὐθὲν μεῖον derives from 
the same fertile brain as μὴ μᾶλλον τὸ δὲν ἢ τὸ μηδέν, and that we have 
thus found another fragment of Democritus partially converted into 
the Attic dialect. If this be conceded, it seems more probable that 
we should supply μεῖον than ἔλαττον (with Diels) in Met. 985° 9. 
Aristotle used the word, Eth. Nic. 5. 1. 1129" 8, δοκεῖ καὶ 7d μεῖον 
κακὸν ἀγαθόν πως εἶναι, where the truer ‘ading, corrupted in the MSS., 


had to be recovered from the commentaries and versions. Cp. 


Aeschyl. P. V. 508, ὡς ἐγὼ | εὕελπίς εἰμι τῶνδέ σ᾽ ἐκ δεσμῶν ἔτι λυθέντα 
μηδὲν μεῖον ἰσχύσειν Διός; Xenoph. Ages. 6. 8, τρόπαια μὴν ᾿Αγεσιλάου 
οὐχ ὅσα ἐστήσατο ἀλλ᾽ ὅσα ἐστρατεύσατο δίκαιον νομίζειν. μεῖον μὲν γὰρ 
οὐδὲν ἐκράτει κτλ.; Herondas 3, 59, ἕξει yap οὐδὲν μεῖον; ibid. 15, 2. ὃς 
δ᾽ ἔχει μεῖον τούτου τι. 


MIDDLETOWN, Conn., 
Fes. 25, 1913. 








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